Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship by Oldfather, Chad M. et al.
Florida Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 5 Article 2
10-17-2012
Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated
Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the
Methodology of Legal Scholarship
Chad M. Oldfather
Joseph P. Bockhorst
Brian P. Dimmer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst, and Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis,
Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1189 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/2
1189 
TRIANGULATING JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS: AUTOMATED 
CONTENT ANALYSIS, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND THE 
METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Chad M. Oldfather

 
Joseph P. Bockhorst

 
Brian P. Dimmer
***
 
Abstract 
The increasing availability of digital versions of court documents, 
coupled with increases in the power and sophistication of computational 
methods of textual analysis, promises to enable both the creation of new 
avenues of scholarly inquiry and the refinement of old ones. This 
Article advances that project in three respects. First, it examines the 
potential for automated content analysis to mitigate one of the 
methodological problems that afflicts both content analysis and 
traditional legal scholarship—their acceptance on faith of the 
proposition that judicial opinions accurately report information about 
the cases they resolve and courts‘ decisional processes. Because 
automated methods can quickly process large amounts of text, they 
allow for assessment of the correspondence between opinions and other 
documents in the case, thereby providing a window into how closely 
opinions track the information provided by the litigants. Second, it 
explores one such novel measure—the ―responsiveness‖ of opinions to 
briefs—in terms of its connection to both adjudicative theory and 
existing scholarship on the behavior of courts and judges. Finally, it 
reports our efforts to test the viability of automated methods for 
assessing responsiveness on a sample of briefs and opinions from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Though we are 
focused primarily on validating our methodology, rather than on the 
results it generates, our initial investigation confirms that even basic 
approaches to automated content analysis provide useful information 
about responsiveness, and generates intriguing results that suggest 
avenues for further study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American legal process has always been document-intensive.
1
 
Litigation occurs primarily through the submission of written briefs and 
often reaches its final resolution via a written judicial opinion. Legal 
scholarship has long reflected the centrality of the written word, albeit 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1159, 1178–85 (2004) (tracing the development of the American legal system‘s writing-
centered nature and attributing it to the relatively vast geography of the United States coupled 
with the lack of trained barristers in the early days of our legal system). 
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in a limited way. In its classic form, it focuses overwhelmingly, and 
often exclusively, on judicial opinions.
2
 This is understandable. Until 
recently, judicial opinions have constituted the only readily available 
source of documentary raw material for scholars. 
Yet traditional legal scholarship‘s reliance on judicial opinions is its 
potential Achilles‘ heel. Such work takes on faith that opinions 
accurately reflect not only the court‘s reasoning, but also the facts and 
other features of the disputes that the opinions resolve.
3
 If this is 
incorrect, and if opinions do not reliably provide an accurate report, 
then scholarship that relies entirely upon them may fail to perceive what 
is truly taking place, and thereby serve as an unreliable guide to its 
subject.
4
 
Over the past several decades, however, a greater range of 
documents has become available, providing access to the litigants‘ 
perspective on the cases that reach the courts. One can now obtain 
electronic versions of opinions and, to an increasing degree, the parties‘ 
briefs through commercial services such as Westlaw and Lexis, as well 
as through courts‘ websites. At the same time, the power and 
sophistication of computational techniques of textual analysis have 
increased as well. These techniques have most famously been used to 
explore disputed questions of authorship, ranging from the Federalist 
Papers and some of Shakespeare‘s works to e-mails connected with the 
founding of Facebook.
5
 It is hardly surprising that researchers have 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008) (―The traditional legal scholarly enterprise relies, like 
literary interpretation, on the interpreter‘s authoritative expertise to select important cases and to 
draw out noteworthy themes and potential social effects of decisions.‖). 
 3. See id. at 95–96. We discuss this point at greater length below. See infra Part I. 
 4. See, e.g., Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 559 (2001) (―The judicial opinion is the judge‘s story justifying the 
judgment. The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge chooses to relate are 
inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of the case.‖); Robert P. Burns, The 
Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205, 219 (2001): 
The rhetoric of appellate opinions is designed, in part, to reflect the conception 
of the Rule of Law that is expressed in the Received View. Only hypothetical 
facts, or facts that are ―found‖ by a court, lose the morally significant 
uncertainty and the normative multivalence surrounding virtually all ―facts‖ in 
the trial court, and, I might add, in the world. The temptation to recount such 
―facts,‖ by choices of characterization and inclusion with the legal norms and 
the preferred outcome in mind is almost irresistible. The expected unity of the 
opinion demands it. And so it is no surprise that lawyers, even appellate 
lawyers, often believe that the account of the facts provided by appellate courts 
is deeply unfair. 
 5. See Ben Zimmer, Decoding Your E-Mail Personality, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/opinion/sunday/24gray.html. 
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started to apply them to legal documents.
6
  
Our core project in this Article is to introduce a methodological 
approach that, we contend, promises to shed some light on whether 
scholars‘ faith in the accuracy of judicial opinions is misplaced, as well 
as to illuminate a range of other questions relating to judicial 
performance and institutional design. We develop a specific measure 
that employs computational methods to assess—or, if you will, 
―triangulate‖—the relationship among briefs and opinions.7 
We call the characteristic under study ―judicial responsiveness.‖ In 
brief, the concept of responsiveness originates from the idea that the 
judicial role is, and for the most part ought to be, fundamentally 
reactive.
8
 Reduced to its essence, the notion stems from the recognition 
that the judicial system exists primarily to provide a peaceful means of 
resolving disputes. From this, the argument runs, it follows that courts 
should focus primarily on addressing the parties‘ disputes, and should 
doing so on the terms by which the parties themselves conceive of them. 
If, for example, the parties regard their dispute as turning on the proper 
application of the case of Smith v. Jones, one would thus expect the 
court hearing their case to resolve it primarily with reference to Smith v. 
Jones. This is not, of course, to suggest that the court must always 
restrict itself to Smith v. Jones. As Amanda Frost has pointed out, the 
judicial system serves ends other than dispute resolution, such that it 
will often be appropriate for a court to draw on a broader range of 
material than what the parties have placed before it.
9
 It might be that 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See infra Section I.B. 
 7. We are not the first to apply computational methods to judicial opinions. See generally 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We Care)?, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their 
Opinions]; Michael Evans et al., Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content Analysis 
to Enhance Empirical Legal Research, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1007 (2007). 
 8. For the classic articulation of this view, see generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Fuller‘s model ―calls for the judiciary to 
assume a passive role pursuant to which judges restrict themselves as much as possible to 
reacting to the parties‘ arguments.‖ Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of 
Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 140 (2005) [hereinafter Oldfather, 
Defining Judicial Inactivism]; see also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A 
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 2 (1984): 
The adversary system relies on a neutral and passive decision maker to 
adjudicate disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries in a contested 
proceeding. He is expected to refrain from making any judgments until the 
conclusion of the contest and is prohibited from becoming actively involved in 
the gathering of evidence or the settlement of the case. 
 9. See generally Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009) 
(defending the courts‘ practice of addressing claims and arguments that the parties have not 
raised). 
4
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Smith v. Jones must be read in light of other cases that the parties have 
overlooked, or perhaps even that some issue prior to the application of 
Smith v. Jones, such as jurisdiction, will end up driving the court‘s 
decision.
10
 But there remains a basic obligation—though undoubtedly 
contestable in its particulars
11—to grapple with what the parties have 
put before the court, such that even a court that grounds its decision 
elsewhere should address the question of why Smith v. Jones does not 
govern.
12
 Our aim here is not to resolve these normative disputes, 
though we hope and expect that our methodology will generate results 
that will help ground them. 
Measures of judicial responsiveness are potentially valuable in at 
least four broad respects regardless of one‘s preference for judicial 
passivity. First, and at the most basic level, they can inform our 
understanding of how the judiciary works by allowing for assessment of 
differences among courts and judges at both the same, and different, 
levels of the judicial hierarchy and over time. Because, for example, an 
appellate court‘s institutional role is different from a trial court‘s, we 
would expect to see a different relationship among briefs and opinions 
at the two levels.
13
 Courts facing different docket pressures may vary as 
well. In addition, investigations of responsiveness might inform debates 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See id. at 462–63 (examining how courts use jurisdictional issues to drive their 
decisions); id. at 463–67 (outlining various methods courts use to address arguments not raised 
by the litigants). 
 11. On one view, judicial decision-making that fails to be appropriately responsive 
constitutes ―judicial inactivism.‖ Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions 
as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 745 (2006) [hereinafter Oldfather, 
Remedying Judicial Inactivism]. There is plenty of anecdotal support for the suggestion that 
courts at least occasionally disregard their obligation to address the parties‘ contentions. See, 
e.g., id. at 762, 774 & nn.151–52. And the increasing institutional pressures faced by most 
courts, primarily as a result of rising caseloads, have resulted in a situation in which there is 
arguably a greater likelihood of such ―judicial inactivism,‖ whether through inadvertence or a 
more conscious cutting of corners. Id. at 745. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that 
the sorts of behavior associated with inactivism has become epidemic. See, e.g., William M. 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the 
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274–97 (1996) (examining shortcuts that 
courts are increasingly taking in the decision-making process and their impact on the quality of 
justice obtained by litigants). 
 12. As Judge Richard A. Posner has put it, ―For the judge, the duty to decide the case (and 
with reasonable dispatch) is primary. He does not choose his cases, or the sequence in which 
they are presented to him, or decree a leisurely schedule on which to decide them.‖ Richard A. 
Posner, Tribute to Ronald Dworkin and a Note on Pragmatic Adjudication, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 9, 12 (2007). For an effort to develop the contours of this duty see also Oldfather, 
Defining Judicial Inactivism, supra note 8, at 160–81. 
 13. Trial courts are, in general, more focused on the resolution of disputes, while appellate 
courts place comparatively greater emphasis on the refinement and development of legal 
standards. Because appellate courts must cast their gaze more broadly, we might expect to see 
less responsiveness in their opinions. 
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over the extent to which ideology and other nonlegal factors drive 
judicial decision making. All else being equal, greater responsiveness is 
consistent with there being less space for the operation of ideology.
14
 
Second, assessments of responsiveness can inform more normatively 
oriented scholarship, such as work attempting to assess judicial quality 
or critiquing the device of unpublished opinions.
15
 Third, this line of 
research might yield payoffs to advocates. To the extent that it becomes 
possible to know specifics about what triggers greater responsiveness—
such as, for example, whether the filing of a reply brief has an effect—
lawyers will be able to adjust their efforts accordingly.
16
 Fourth, as we 
have already alluded, studies of responsiveness might mitigate one of 
legal scholarship‘s methodological problems, namely that of taking on 
faith that judicial opinions accurately reflect the cases they describe. An 
appropriately crafted inquiry into the extent to which opinions appear to 
be ―products‖ of the parties‘ briefs can provide evidence on the question 
of whether this faith is warranted.
17
 
Although the relationship among the parties and the court stands at 
the heart of the judicial process, it has historically been difficult to 
assess systematically. In part, this is a product of the conceptual 
difficulties involved in determining precisely what the responsiveness 
obligation entails in any given case. As suggested above, sometimes a 
properly oriented court should focus on Smith v. Jones, while other 
times it will be appropriate, and even necessary, for the court to look 
beyond a particular case. There are practical difficulties as well. The 
measurement of a court‘s responsiveness in a given case requires nearly 
as much effort as was required to generate the court‘s decision in the 
first instance. The evaluator must first come to an understanding of the 
particulars of the parties‘ arguments. She must then measure whether 
the court has engaged with those arguments and whether its decision is, 
in a meaningful sense, a product of those arguments (and thus a decision 
that resolves the parties‘ dispute rather than some simulacrum). That 
process in turn raises at least two barriers to large-n research: the labor-
intensive nature of the evaluation makes it impractical, and the 
subjectivity of the process introduces significant concerns about inter-
                                                                                                                     
 14. To elaborate, the hypothesis here is that a court that issues a highly responsive opinion 
will have left less space for the operation of ideology than a court that does not tether its 
analysis to the arguments and authorities in the parties‘ briefs. This is not to deny that 
ideological or other non-legal factors might drive such a decision. It is instead simply to assert 
that the limits imposed by responsiveness are real, and to posit that in the aggregate a court that 
limits the range of materials it offers in justification of its decisions will take fewer inputs (and 
thereby fewer improper inputs) into account in reaching its decisions than a court that does not 
so limit itself. 
 15. See infra Section I.B. 
 16. See infra Section I.B. 
 17. See infra Section I.B. 
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coder reliability.
18
 
Our final aim, then, is to explore whether computational methods 
can overcome these barriers. Enlisting computers rather than humans to 
―read‖ and code opinions and other documents will enable researchers 
to analyze large amounts of information in short periods of time, and to 
do so with no need to worry about consistency from one reader to the 
next. Using a set of briefs and opinions from the First Circuit, we have 
investigated two automated measures of judicial responsiveness both of 
which avoid the practical difficulties associated with manually assessing 
responsiveness, both of which employ a notion of the similarity between 
briefs and opinions. The first involves assessing document similarity 
through analysis of textual content of briefs and opinions. The second 
utilizes a similar methodology applied to citations to authority; that is, 
we assessed the extent to which opinions cite to the same legal 
authorities as relied upon by the parties in their briefs. In order to test 
the validity of these measures, we also undertook the sort of full-scale 
assessment of a set of cases outlined in the preceding paragraph, 
reviewing the briefs and opinions in depth and coding them for 
responsiveness.  
Our primary focus was on establishing the viability of automated 
measures of responsiveness. A comparison of the results of our 
automated and manual assessments suggests both the validity of an 
automated approach and avenues for potential refinement. Other results 
were also intriguing. For example, reply briefs in our sample scored 
substantially lower in terms of responsiveness than principal briefs. And 
the court‘s citation practices show surprisingly little overlap between 
authorities cited in briefs and those cited in opinions. It is unclear what 
to make of this—one could equally tell a story of a court admirably 
exercising independent judgment or of a court failing to meet its 
obligations to the litigants (or perhaps even to the law). The truth is 
probably somewhere in between. Either way, the results provide further 
support for the conclusion that the investigation of responsiveness 
promises to generate useful insights. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an 
overview of prior efforts to apply automated content analysis to legal 
documents and attempts to situate those efforts within the larger project 
of content analysis. As our brief survey reveals, past research has 
focused on questions relating to the authorship of judicial opinions,
19
 to 
the refinement of quantitative empirical research,
20
 and to the 
exploration of the relationship between party briefs and judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Evans et al., supra note 7, at 1008–09.  
 19. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
 20. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
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opinions.
21
 This work remains in its early stages but promises to 
facilitate new types of inquiry into old questions, as well as enabling 
new types of research into the behavior of courts and litigants. We 
contend that a broader form of content analysis—one that is made 
considerably more practicable through the use of automated methods—
offers the potential to mitigate one of the methodological problems of 
both content analysis and traditional legal scholarship. Specifically, 
inquiry into the relationship among opinions and the briefs and other 
documentary components of a case can provide a means for assessing 
whether judicial opinions are consistently faithful in their reporting of 
the facts and arguments in the cases they resolve. 
Part II makes the case for measuring responsiveness as a component 
of broader scholarly efforts to understand courts and judges. 
Responsiveness may be valuable in its own right, as a characteristic of 
legitimate adjudication. It may also assist in addressing various 
questions of institutional design and process, such as those relating to 
the effects of caseload pressures and the role of ideology in judging, as 
well as in efforts to assess judicial quality. Part III relates the 
methodology and results of our initial investigation of responsiveness, 
using a set of cases from the First Circuit, and employing methods that 
analyze the correspondence among briefs and opinions using both 
textual similarity and citation overlap. That work provides initial 
confirmation of the reliability and validity of automated methods of 
measuring responsiveness. Finally, we conclude and offer our thoughts 
on future directions that our research might take. 
I.  THE USES AND POTENTIAL USES OF AUTOMATED CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Our broad topic is automated content analysis, which is of course a 
subset of the larger domain of content analysis. In a recent article in the 
California Law Review, Professors Mark Hall and Ronald Wright 
consider the prospect of content analysis as ―a uniquely legal empirical 
methodology.‖22 At its heart, the method is straightforward and charts a 
middle ground between traditional and empirical legal scholarship. ―[A] 
scholar collects a set of documents, such as judicial opinions on a 
particular subject, and systematically reads them, recording consistent 
features of each and drawing inferences about their use and meaning.‖23 
The result is to combine traditional scholarship‘s textual engagement24 
                                                                                                                     
 21. See infra Subsection I.B.3. 
 22. Hall & Wright, supra note 2, at 64. The backdrop for their analysis is their assessment 
that legal scholarship does not have its own unique empirical methodology, tending instead to 
borrow social scientific techniques, with mixed results. Id. at 63–64. 
 23. Id. at 64. 
 24. ―This method comes naturally to legal scholars because it resembles the classic 
scholarly exercise of reading a collection of cases, finding common threads that link the 
8
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with the methodological rigor of quantitative empirical analysis. 
Properly conducted, content analysis involves systematic selection and 
coding of cases, often followed by statistical analysis of the coding.
25
 
The method‘s rigor and social-scientific overtones arise primarily 
through the prospect of replicability.
26
 If other researchers would reach 
the same conclusions were they to read and analyze the same cases, then 
the authority for the project‘s results lies in the method rather than in the 
researcher.
27
 
Much of modern legal scholarship, however, falls into two other 
categories.
28
 The first, which we will somewhat loosely refer to as 
―traditional legal scholarship,‖ has as its hallmark close attention to 
judicial opinions. The scholar starts with a basic legal question, such as 
―How should the Fourth Amendment apply to e-mails?‖ The core of the 
scholar‘s effort to answer the question in this form of scholarship 
consists of the close scrutiny and detailed analysis of, in this case, past 
Fourth Amendment decisions, particularly those generated by the 
United States Supreme Court. Much of the reasoning is analogical, with 
the author working to show that there are pertinent ways in which e-
mail is, or is not, analogous to the situations addressed in previous 
cases. She may draw on other disciplines, such as history, political 
theory, or psychology, but the work remains rooted in the content of 
judicial opinions. This sort of work proceeds based on a number of 
typically unstated assumptions, including acceptance of the propositions 
that legal rules and doctrine operate as meaningful guides to and 
restraints on judicial decision making and that opinions accurately 
reflect the rules and doctrine that the court viewed as governing its 
decision. 
The second category of scholarship falls under the banner of 
―empirical legal studies.‖ This sort of work, which has slowly migrated 
from political science departments into legal academia, focuses on 
criteria that can be observed and quantified.
29
 Rooted in legal realism 
and rational choice theory, it views judicial decision making as largely 
the product of political attitudes and as being as driven by ideology as 
legislative voting.
30
 In its most basic form, the variables taken into 
                                                                                                                     
opinions, and commenting on their significance.‖ Id. 
 25. See id. at 79–85. 
 26. See id. at 64. 
 27. See id. at 66. 
 28. Note that we have said ―much‖ and not ―all‖ or even ―most.‖ The array of work that 
appears in law reviews these days is far too varied to fit into these two categories. 
 29. This work‘s intellectual roots include legal realism, economic rational choice theory, 
and the behavioralist movement in political science. See ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM 177–78 (1967). 
 30. The most basic form is the attitudinal model: 
9
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account in the analysis are (1) judges‘ ideology, measured via some 
objective proxy such as party of the appointing president,
31
 and (2) the 
ideological valence of a jurist‘s vote in a given case, also measured in a 
reductionist, objective way, such that, for example, any vote in favor of 
a criminal defendant will be regarded as liberal.
32
 The research is 
quantitative in nature, using large-n studies and statistical methodology. 
Scholarship produced using these methods has established, at a 
minimum, that there is a relatively strong correlation between ideology 
and judicial behavior as measured in these ways.
33
 
A.  Content Analysis 
Content analysis stands as something of a hybrid of these two 
methodologies.
34
 It reflects both traditional legal scholarship‘s attention 
to texts and empirical legal studies‘ systematization. Although content 
analysis was not recognized as a genre prior to the publication of their 
article,
35
 Hall and Wright found 134 law review articles published 
                                                                                                                     
The attitudinal model represents a melding together of key concepts from legal 
realism, political science, psychology, and economics. This model holds that 
the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the 
ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the 
way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he 
did because he was extremely liberal. 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 86 (2002). 
 31. More recent work has incorporated refinements such as including the political party of 
the judge‘s home-state senators into the measure of ideology. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles et al., 
Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 
624 (2001). 
 32. For example, much of this work is based on databases created by political scientist 
Harold Spaeth. 
Each case is given either a liberal or conservative code based on the nature of 
the prevailing party. So, for example, Spaeth codes cases involving criminal 
defendants as liberal if the defendant wins and conservative if the government 
wins; cases involving federal taxation, on the other hand, are coded as liberal if 
the government wins and conservative if the taxpayer prevails. Spaeth is—quite 
deliberately—uninterested in the content of the opinions. 
Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme 
Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 485 (2009). 
 33. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
POLITICS 26–28 (Whittington et al. eds., 2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY app. at 152 (2006); Frank B. 
Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2009). 
 34. See Hall & Wright, supra note 2, at 64. 
 35. They even noted: 
10
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between 1956 and 2006 that used content analysis.
36
 Within that period, 
they found such studies being published with increasing frequency, a 
development they attribute in part to the availability of computerized 
legal databases and statistical software.
37
 Studies employing the 
methodology have ranged across a broad swath of subject areas as well 
as ―focus[ing] on questions of legal methods, judicial decision making, 
and statutory interpretation.‖38 The work has appeared ―in the very best 
law journals‖39 and seems ―somewhat more likely to generate 
discussion and citation than law review articles more generally.‖40  
Hall and Wright do not position themselves as unqualified advocates 
for the use of content analysis in legal scholarship. They instead regard 
it as providing another useful perspective, and aim to identify and weigh 
its benefits and drawbacks, and to generate a set of ―best practices‖ to 
be used in the implementation of this approach.
41
 Systematic content 
analysis, like any process that involves a process of categorization and 
coding, entails a certain amount of reductionism and glossing over of 
nuance.
42
 And it is best employed in contexts where each document 
under assessment is entitled to equal weight, for the simple reason that 
the method is ill-suited to adequately account, for example, for cases 
with disproportionate influence within a body of law.
43
 What results is a 
methodology that ―can augment conventional analysis by identifying 
previously unnoticed patterns that warrant deeper study, or sometimes 
by correcting misimpressions based on ad hoc surveys of atypical 
cases.‖44 Thus, while it generates results that are more objective, in the 
sense that others should be able to replicate them, and broad, because 
the methodology can more easily cover large swaths of cases, it tends 
toward shallowness, ―trad[ing] the pretense of ontological certainty for 
a more provisional understanding of case law.‖45 
                                                                                                                     
In project after project, legal researchers reinvent this methodological wheel on 
their own. The two of us, for instance, each learned how to do content analysis 
on the fly, feeling at first as if we each discovered something new until we 
learned that we had each done the same thing independently. We see now that 
many of our colleagues share the same sense of having found their own way.  
Id. at 74–75. 
 36. See id. at 72 tbl.1. 
 37. See id. at 69–70. 
 38. Id. at 73. 
 39. Id. at 70. 
 40. Id. at 74. 
 41. See id. at 100–20. 
 42. See id. at 82–83. 
 43. See id. at 83–84. 
 44. Id. at 87. 
 45. Id. 
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Content analysis‘s primary focus on judicial opinions acts as both an 
advantage and a limitation. The advantage comes in that opinions matter 
in their own right. Prototypical empirical work relies on proxy measures 
for assessing the ideology of judges and case results. Because the 
content of judicial opinions matters both to the parties in a given dispute 
and to those for whom knowledge of the law is important, opinions 
themselves constitute a significant form of judicial behavior rather than 
standing as a proxy for some underlying phenomenon. Of course, 
opinions might also serve as proxies for underlying behavior—we care 
about the motivation behind opinions, and the extent to which the 
reasons provided in an opinion are the ―real‖ reasons behind a 
decision.
46
 This leads to perhaps the most significant limitation of 
content analysis—its ultimate dependence on the documents under 
study, which will most often be judicial opinions. For an analysis of the 
contents of judicial opinions to yield useful results, it must be the case 
that the opinions meaningfully reveal something about whatever is 
under study. Put differently, the reading and analysis of opinions will 
provide insight into the factors that drive decision making only to the 
extent that opinions actually relate the factors that in fact drive decision 
making. In this regard, consider two types of goals one might have in 
analyzing the content of opinions. The first is to learn something about 
the opinions as opinions. One could, for example, focus on the use of 
certain rhetorical strategies or otherwise analyze how judges choose to 
justify their decisions.
47
 In this type of inquiry the sole concern is on the 
text, and not on some underlying phenomenon as to which the text is a 
mere window.
48
 One can consider a court‘s use of a rhetorical device in 
an opinion without needing to make any assumptions about whether the 
court was, for example, sincere in using it. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 46. See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008). For 
other works directly addressing the topic of judicial candor, see generally Scott Altman, Beyond 
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial 
Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. 
REV. 721 (1979); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509 (2001); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 731 (1987); Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 155 (1994); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989). 
 47. For some recent examples, see generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien 
Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1545 (2011) (analyzing the use of immigration metaphors); Julie A. Oseid, The Power of 
Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation Between Church and State,‖ 7 J. ASS‘N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 123 (2010); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Metaphors: The 
Wall of Separation and the Penumbra, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 459 (2011). 
 48. This is not to suggest that style is divorced from substance. Metaphors, for example, 
are not simply ornamentation, but also shape, sometimes insidiously, the legal standards they are 
used to describe. See, e.g., Sirico, supra note 47, at 459. 
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Most often, however, the researcher has a second type of goal in 
mind, which is to understand something for which the opinions are, in a 
sense, a proxy. That is, the content analyst views opinions as law in the 
Holmesian sense of informing predictions about what courts will do.
49
 
An opinion‘s value in this regard depends to a great degree on the 
correspondence between what it says and the judge‘s actual reasons for 
deciding the case.
50
 As Hall and Wright recognize, a problem arises—
for both content analysis and traditional legal scholarship—in that 
opinions might not consistently reflect those reasons.
51
 This might be a 
product of cognitive limitations, because a judge might be unaware of, 
or unable to articulate fully, all of the relevant components of his 
decisional process.
52
 It might be a product of insincerity or deceit, in 
that the opinion provides reasons that the judge recognizes are not the 
true factors motivating or explaining her decision.
53
 Or it might result 
from a natural tendency to want to provide a strong justification for a 
decision already reached, such that the opinion highlights those aspects 
of the case that support the decision while minimizing those that do 
                                                                                                                     
 49. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 
(1897) (―The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law.‖); see also K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND 
ITS STUDY 14 (4th prtg. 1973): 
But if I am right, finding out what the judges say is but the beginning of your 
task. You will have to take what they say and compare it with what they do. 
You will have to see whether what they say matches with what they do. You 
will have to be distrustful of whether they themselves know (any better than 
other men) the ways of their own doing, and of whether they describe it 
accurately, even if they know it. 
 50. As Professor Frederick Schauer points out, there is tension between the positions of 
Holmes and Llewellyn on this point: 
[I]f we were to undertake a statistical analysis of ‗the law‘ in order best to 
engage in the process of predicting future legal outcomes, we would, in some 
form or other, look to identify the variables that had the greatest predictive 
value. These variables might, as Holmes suspects, be the variables of legal 
doctrinal categorization. But whether the variables were in fact what Holmes 
suspected—and desired—would be an empirical question, and it might turn out, 
as Llewellyn suspected to the contrary, that they were variables not likely to be 
identified from the opinions of the courts that reached those decisions. 
Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 783–84 (1998). 
 51. Hall & Wright, supra note 2, at 100 (―The major limitation of content analysis—a 
limit that applies equally to traditional interpretive methods—is that one cannot treat as accurate 
and complete the facts and reasons given in opinions. Therefore, researchers should be cautious 
about the meanings they attach to observations made through content analysis.‖). 
 52. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1305–08 (2008). 
 53. See sources cited supra note 46. 
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not.
54
 Whatever the reason, the consequence is that opinions might 
provide an incomplete or misleading picture of the decisional behavior 
they purport to reflect, such that content analysis-based efforts to 
understand or predict judicial behavior will merely reflect any 
systematic disconnect between opinions‘ depiction of law and 
decisional processes and their actual operation in practice.
55
 Thus, if one 
wishes to gain an accurate understanding of what courts do, inquiry 
focused solely on opinions will generate a potentially incomplete and 
misleading picture. 
Of course, this is not a fatal flaw. As alluded to above, the same 
difficulty arises in traditional legal scholarship. The fact that neither 
method is perfect does not mean that they cannot generate useful 
results. Moreover, the process of content analysis can itself incorporate 
steps designed to check for correspondence between the facts reported 
in the opinion and the actual facts of the case.
56
 A researcher with 
enough information about a case could independently measure the 
extent to which an opinion accurately depicts the underlying dispute. 
Such an analysis could involve comparison of the parties‘ briefs to the 
opinion, or it might extend more broadly to include the analysis of all or 
portions of the record as well as lower court opinions.
57
  
                                                                                                                     
 54. Professor Dan Simon has explored this phenomenon in connection with his analysis of 
the seeming disconnect between Justice Cardozo‘s opinions, which give a ―distinct sense of 
obvious correctness‖ and are ―cast in the mold of formalism,‖ and his off-bench descriptions of 
the judicial process, which depict the judge as faced with tasks that ―are complex, difficult, and 
replete with clashes between seemingly irreconcilable opposites.‖ Dan Simon, The Double-
Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1043, 
1046 (2000). Professor Simon attributes this not to conscious duplicity, but to ―the fact that 
closure is a naturally occurring cognitive phenomenon that accompanies mental tasks of the 
kind involved in legal decision-making.‖ Id. at 1065. ―[E]ven in the face of complex, difficult, 
underdetermined tasks, people ultimately experience their decisions as being solidly determined 
by the arguments and thus singularly correct.‖ Id.; see also Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint 
in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 
1100–01 (2002). 
 55. See Hall & Wright, supra note 2, at 99. 
 56. Id. at 97–98. Hall and Wright report that several of the studies they looked at 
incorporated such steps via close readings of opinions or comparison of appellate majority 
opinions with trial court or dissenting opinions. See id. at 97–98 & nn.139–40. Those they 
reference include Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory 
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); Joseph A. 
Ignagni, U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making and the Free Exercise Clause, 55 REV. POL. 511 
(1993); Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of 
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795 (2005); Reed C. Lawlor, Fact 
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 JURIMETRICS J. 107 (1968); Richard A. Posner, A 
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002). 
 57. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 522 (1995) 
(―No evaluative study of an individual judge is complete until his opinions are compared with 
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Notice, however, that this sort of inquiry seems likely to depart from 
the level of rigor and systematization associated with content analysis. 
Well-conducted content analysis aims for replicability and uses coding 
categories that can be consistently applied across a body of cases.
58
 An 
assessment of the fit between a court‘s depiction of the facts and the 
actual facts seems inevitably to require the exercise of judgment 
because the researcher must determine whether, for example, a court‘s 
failure to mention what the researcher believes to have been a key fact 
fell outside the proper bounds of the court‘s discretion. In other words, 
the researcher in such a situation necessarily chooses to substitute her 
own view of what full candor and sincerity would require, with that 
view being a product of contestable judgment calls about the 
significance of certain facts in light of applicable legal standards rather 
than something that can be made by reference to objective criteria.  
The process described in the preceding paragraph sounds more like 
traditional legal scholarship in its combination of deep textual 
engagement and normative evaluations. In addition to reintroducing the 
problem of subjectivity, this sort of deep comparison would be (as we 
can attest based on the efforts described below)
59
 incredibly time- and 
labor-intensive. Determining whether a court was faithful to the record 
and the parties‘ arguments would take at least as much time as was 
required to reach the initial decision. Addressing these problems 
requires the development of proxy measures. Just as political scientists 
have relied on measures such as party of appointing president as a 
stand-in for more nuanced measures of judicial ideology, so might we 
seek such measures for assessing the correspondence between opinions‘ 
depiction of cases and the underlying reality.
60
 To be sure, even such a 
measure would not remove all difficulties. An opinion‘s fidelity to facts 
might be normatively desirable in its own right, as might responsiveness 
to the arguments in the parties‘ briefs.61 But even these are proxies for 
what some might regard as the true underlying concern: the extent to 
which an opinion fully and accurately reflects the court‘s decisional 
process.
62
 That, of course, will remain known only to the judge, and 
even then only to the extent that true self-knowledge is possible. 
Still, proxy-based measures of correspondence or responsiveness 
would provide at least a tentative answer to the claim that content 
                                                                                                                     
the lawyers‘ briefs. This is necessary in order to determine not only the judge‘s ‗value added‘ 
but also his scrupulousness with respect to the facts of record and the arguments of the 
parties.‖). 
 58. See Hall & Wright, supra note 2, at 105–09. 
 59. See infra Subsection III.D.1. 
 60. See infra Section III.D for an exploration of the use of word and citation counts as 
such proxies. 
 61. See infra Part II for discussion and development. 
 62. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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analysis-based and traditional legal scholarship are suspect based on 
their assumptions about the accuracy with which opinions relate facts 
and reasoning.
63
 If the results of studies employing such measures 
suggest high correspondence between opinions and the remaining 
corpus of text in a case, that would suggest that opinions faithfully 
reflect the application of legal standards to cases. While it is unlikely 
that any such analysis could provide conclusive proof as to any given 
court‘s level of faithfulness, comparative analyses of courts would 
allow at the very least for relative assessments. As we develop below, 
automated content analysis holds great promise in addressing these 
methodological difficulties. 
B.  Automated Content Analysis 
Adjudication, especially at the appellate level, is an almost entirely 
text-based practice. Even the spoken portions of lower-court 
proceedings are reduced to text in the form of a transcript of the 
proceedings. There are exceptions, primarily photographs and video 
recordings, but for the most part an appellate case—or at least the 
visible manifestations of an appellate case—consists of a collection of 
words. These words have become increasingly accessible and 
manipulable over the past several decades. Westlaw, Lexis, and other 
databases have of course long provided access to judicial opinions and, 
to a lesser extent, briefs. Courts themselves are slowly making more 
information available electronically.
64
 It is conceivable, and perhaps 
inevitable, that court records, including transcripts and documentary 
evidence, will be readily available electronically in the relatively near 
future. 
It should accordingly come as no surprise that scholars have begun 
to apply computational methodologies to the analysis of adjudication. 
The ability to ―read‖ opinions through automated content analysis 
software offers the prospect of a different, and in some respects deeper, 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Professor Pamela Corley made a similar observation in reporting her use of plagiarism 
software to examine the correspondence between briefs and majority opinions at the Supreme 
Court level: 
If the justices are motivated to reach legally sound decisions, they are likely to 
be influenced by the persuasiveness of legal argumentation. Thus, the 
arguments presented to the Court in the briefs are part of a legal model of 
decision making, one in which a quality argument can persuade the justices to 
interpret precedent in a particular way and to develop new legal rules, both of 
which affect decision making in future cases.  
Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 
61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 468–69 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 64. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 
(2009) (explaining the federal court system‘s move towards electronic records). 
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exploration of the behavior of individual judges and justices. Early 
efforts fall into three general categories: (1) studies designed to explore 
questions concerning the authorship of judicial opinions; (2) those 
employing computational methods as refinements to the traditional 
machinery of empirical legal studies; (3) and those exploring the 
relationship between briefs and judicial opinions. None of these is 
unique in the sense that they all have roots in prior programs of 
scholarship. Each nonetheless holds out the promise of a unique 
perspective on the judicial process.
65
 
1.  Authorship of Judicial Opinions  
Questions concerning authorship of judicial opinions, such as which 
judges write their own, which justice is the primary author of a per 
curiam opinion, and whether one judge consistently ghost wrote for 
another, are inherently interesting to those who pay attention to courts. 
As Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati point out, there are also 
scholarly payoffs to such inquiries. Conceiving of the judiciary as 
presenting two levels of agency problems (judges as agents of the 
polity, and clerks as agents of the judges), Choi and Gulati contend that 
information about authorship could ―help the management of judicial 
agents in at least three circumstances: deciding on promotion when the 
quality of the final output is hard to evaluate, determining incentives for 
the judges as part of a judicial opinion production team, and assessing 
how best to allocate resources to the judiciary.‖66 Knowledge about 
whether and to what extent a judge is involved in the opinion-writing 
process, they suggest, can be used as part of a comprehensive 
assessment of judicial quality.
67
  
Choi and Gulati also note the usefulness of the information to 
ongoing scholarly efforts to understand judicial behavior. A judge‘s 
tendency toward authorship rather than editorship might serve as an 
explanatory variable with respect to a variety of factors such as ―voting 
patterns, citation rates and styles, invocation rates, publication patterns, 
independence levels, and choices about styles of argument (for example, 
                                                                                                                     
 65. There is a sense in which this research is incredibly rudimentary. Most forms of 
automated content analysis put computers to work more or less as ―dumb clerks,‖ albeit ones 
that are incredibly fast and accurate. Robert L. Stevenson, In Praise of Dumb Clerks: Computer-
Assisted Content Analysis, in THEORY, METHOD, AND PRACTICE IN COMPUTER CONTENT 
ANALYSIS 4 (Mark D. West ed. 2001). ―The most promising change in content analysis is the 
ability to search massive quantities of materials instantly. While this may reduce the depth of 
analysis, it increases dramatically the breadth of a study. By itself, this is enough to praise the 
computer‘s value as a dumb clerk.‖ Id. at 5. 
 66. See Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions, supra note 7, at 1083. 
 67. As discussed below, Professors Choi and Gulati have explored the concept of 
measuring judicial quality in a series of recent articles. See infra notes 68–77 and accompanying 
text. 
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whether one prefers the use of multifactor balancing tests).‖68 There 
may be payoffs in terms of institutional design as well. They suggest 
that if, for example, analysis reveals that judges tend to rely more 
heavily on their clerks to draft opinions in certain subject areas, that 
could help shape our views as to the relative desirability of specialized 
courts.
69
 
Choi and Gulati also acknowledge that information about judges‘ 
involvement in the opinion writing process has potential downsides. 
One objection to their inquiry proceeds from the view that it does not 
matter whether a judge is the primary author of an opinion, perhaps on 
the ground that the judge‘s job is primarily that of deciding, with the 
justification for the decision being of substantially less importance.
70
 Of 
course, that view stands in contrast to the assumption, outlined above, 
underlying both content analysis and traditional legal scholarship to the 
effect that judicial opinions accurately reflect law and judicial decision- 
making. A second, and more significant, objection concerns the 
problem of imperfect measurement, which creates the possibility that 
some judges will be inaccurately categorized as editors when they are 
really authors.
71
 In their study, Choi and Gulati used various tests from 
computational linguistics in an effort to determine which federal court 
of appeals judges write their own opinions.
72
 The basic premise 
underlying this sort of inquiry is that at least some writers have stylistic 
fingerprints, which reveal themselves in patterns of word usage.
73
 Choi 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions, supra note 7, at 1090. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 1094–95. Choi and Gulati are (rightly, in our view), underwhelmed by this 
objection. Even if one remains skeptical of the proposition that judicial opinions accurately 
report judicial reasoning, it seems unlikely to be the case that opinions tell us nothing useful. To 
be functional, a precedent-based system seemingly requires not only that written opinions exist, 
but that they be given authoritative weight. See James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (1995) (―Rough prediction, then, and with it a certain kind of 
argument, might be possible in [a system without judicial opinions], but the invocation of the 
past as authority is a different matter and seems to require the existence of the judicial opinion, 
or something like it.‖). Moreover, ―when we are in the pit of actual application, we will discover 
that it is not what the Supreme Court held that matters, but what it said.‖ Frederick Schauer, 
Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (reviewing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985)).  
 71. See Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions, supra note 7, at 1095–96. 
The objection as we have characterized it is not quite the same as what Choi and Gulati report 
the commentators to their article have made. That objection was that there is a better source of 
information concerning judicial authorship, namely the judges themselves. As Choi and Gulati 
convincingly argue, however, there are plenty of reasons to think that judges will not be entirely 
forthcoming on the question. See id. 
 72. See id. at 1103–08. 
 73. Id. at 1099. Although efforts to determine authorship using the methods on other types 
of text date back to the 1930s, their use has expanded with increases in computational power. 
For a listing of significant words, see id. at 1101 & n.68. 
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and Gulati posited that, while individual judges are unlikely to have 
discernible styles, there is likely to be a difference between judicial 
style and law clerk style.
74
 The more that a judge‘s opinions manifest 
inconsistent stylistic markers, they reason, the less likely that judge is to 
be the author of the opinions.
75
 Although their use of generic 
computational linguistics methodologies applied to opinions without 
regard to subject matter failed in the sense of not being able to identify 
the three judges (Boudin, Easterbrook, and Posner) whom they knew to 
be among those who write their own opinions, they experienced 
somewhat greater success when they modified their methodology by 
controlling for subject matter and taking account of features such as 
citation practices
76
 and average length of opinion.
77
 
In another recent study,
78
 Professors Jeffrey Rosenthal and Albert 
Yoon, employing methods similar to those used in projects analyzing 
the authorship of the Federalist Papers
79
 and Shakespeare‘s plays,80 
investigated the commonly held understanding that Supreme Court 
Justices have in recent decades placed growing reliance on their law 
clerks in the opinion-writing process.
81
 Their methodology involved 
examination of frequencies of the use of ―function words‖—common 
words the usage of which can constitute something of an authorial 
fingerprint independent of subject matter.
82
 Similar to Choi and Gulati, 
they posited that a Justice whose writing style showed greater 
variability was likely to have delegated a greater portion of opinion-
writing responsibility to clerks.
83
 Their results were generally consistent 
with prior understandings of the extent to which various individual 
Justices have relied on their clerks, as well as with the proposition that 
such reliance has increased over time.
84
 They were also able to predict 
opinion authorship with a relatively high degree of accuracy.
85
 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 1102. Specifically, they posit that judges are likely to be more confident in their 
analyses than clerks and that, as a result, judge-written opinions will be shorter and include 
fewer citations and footnotes. Id. 
 75. See id. at 1103. 
 76. See id. at 1111–13. 
 77. See id. at 1116–20. 
 78. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the 
Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307 (2011). 
 79. See generally FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID L. WALLACE, INFERENCE AND 
DISPUTED AUTHORSHIP: THE FEDERALIST (1964) (using statistical methods to determine 
authorship of the Federalist Papers). 
 80. For an extensive survey of sources, see Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their 
Opinions, supra note 7, at 1097–98. 
 81. Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 78, at 1311–12. 
 82. Id. at 1312. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See id. at 1337. 
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Finally, Russell Smyth and his colleagues applied these methods to 
investigate longstanding rumors of ghostwriting on the High Court of 
Australia.
86
 Various evidence had suggested that Sir Owen Dixon 
authored a number of opinions issued under the names of his colleagues 
Sir Edward McTiernan and Sir George Rich.
87
 Smyth‘s team concluded, 
with a high degree of confidence, ―that about four per cent of 
McTiernan‘s judgments and 18 per cent of Rich‘s judgments were very 
likely authored by Dixon.‖88 They argue that their findings are not 
merely of value as matters of ―historical curiosity,‖ but because they 
shed light on questions of judicial ethics and the reliability of 
attributions of authorship.
89
 
2.  Refining Empirical Legal Studies 
As noted above, the bread and butter of quantitative empirical legal 
studies has been work that examines the relationship between judicial 
ideology and decision making.
90
 As this work has evolved, scholars 
have refined it primarily by reworking measures of judicial ideology. 
For the most part, however, decisions continue to be coded in terms of 
binary, liberal/conservative categories.
91
 As Professor Michael Evans 
and his colleagues have pointed out, automated content analysis holds 
out the promise of enabling considerably more nuanced coding of the 
results of decision making.
92
 It also offers value because of its 
efficiency, transparency, and replicability. 
Initial efforts to use computational methods have relied primarily on 
a program called Wordscores. A basic description of the method is as 
follows: 
The process begins with the selection of ―reference‖ 
(training) texts, written with a known position along a 
dimension of interest (e.g., ideology, policy issue field, 
etc.). The Wordscores program then generates a word 
frequency matrix for every word (feature) in the reference 
texts. Based on the relative frequencies of each word in the 
reference texts and the values assigned to those documents, 
word scores are then calculated to represent the association 
between words and each document. . . . Finally, text scores 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See generally Yanir Seroussi, Russell Smyth & Ingrid Zuckerman, Ghosts from the 
High Court’s Past: Evidence from Computational Linguistics for Dixon Ghosting for 
McTiernan and Rich, 34 U.N.S.W. L.J. 984 (2011). 
 87. Id. at 985–86. 
 88. Id. at 1003. 
 89. Id. at 987. 
 90. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 485; Evans et al., supra note 7, at 1020–22. 
 92. Evans et al., supra note 7, at 1020–21. 
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are computed for unread, uncharacterized ―virgin‖ texts 
(the test examples), characterizing them with respect to the 
reference documents. The score given to each virgin text is 
simply the average of all word scores for all scored words 
within the text.
93
 
Early studies have shown the promise of the methodology, but also 
make it apparent that much work remains to be done. In one study, 
Professors Kevin McGuire and Georg Vanberg used Wordscores in an 
effort ―to extract valid policy positions from the text of written opinions 
for a series of decisions in the areas of religion and search and 
seizure.‖94 They analyzed Supreme Court opinions dealing with three 
issue areas, having concluded that it was necessary to confine the 
inquiry to specific issues because discussions of different issues will use 
different language.
95
 In each area, they used two Supreme Court 
opinions (of reasonably clear ideological valence) as reference texts, 
and then scored a series of other opinions (the general ideology of 
which they also knew beforehand).
96
 They found that the method was 
unreliable when applied to both majority and dissenting opinions; in 
other words, it could not accurately distinguish between liberal and 
conservative opinions.
97
 It did, however, do a reasonably good job of 
marking the relative position of opinions within groups of exclusively 
liberal or conservative opinions.
98
 
In a similar study, Michael Evans and his colleagues undertook to 
assess 
the performance of the Wordscores and Naïve Bayes 
methods at analyzing U.S. Supreme Court litigant and 
amicus curiae briefs. Specifically, we examine the ability of 
the two approaches to (1) accurately classify the ideological 
position of the various legal briefs, (2) identify words from 
those briefs that are distinctive to opposing ideological 
positions in enhancing interpretive analysis, and (3) detect 
patterns in language usage over time by advocates on a 
single issue.
99
 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 1014. More, including the papers describing and implementing the 
methodology, is available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/wordscores/index.html. 
 94. KEVIN T. MCGUIRE & GEORG VANBERG, MAPPING THE POLICIES OF THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: DATA, OPINIONS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2005), available at http://www.unc.edu/~ 
kmcguire/papers/McGuire_and_Vanberg_2005_APSA_Paper.pdf. 
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. See id. at 15–28. 
 97. See id. 29–30 & n.12. 
 98. See id. at 28. 
 99. Evans et al., supra note 7, at 1023. 
21
Oldfather et al.: Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1210 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
With respect to the first, the best methods accurately characterized 
briefs between 80–90% of the time.100 ―These results present evidence 
for the ability of automated content analysis techniques to classify the 
ideological positions of legal texts and point to the utility of 
computational techniques in general.‖101 
In an early effort to take these sorts of inquiries beyond 
measurements of ideology, Professors Robert Howard and Joseph Smith 
attempted to test the Supreme Court‘s receptiveness to originalist 
arguments.
102
 They used Wordscores and compared the results it 
generated against the coding of an existing database.
103
 Their use of 
Wordscores was more limited than that of other researchers. Rather than 
assessing all the words in the documents they analyzed, they simply 
used the program to count the frequencies of four phrases.
104
 In general, 
they concluded that ―computers can characterize legal briefs, and that 
these characterizations are comparable to those of human coders.‖105 
3.  Exploring the Relationship Between Briefs and Opinions 
Some work in both the traditional and empirical genres has sought 
to assess the impact of briefs and other forms of advocacy on judicial 
decision making. Work from a traditional, doctrinal perspective tends to 
involve a close, qualitative reading and comparison of briefs to 
opinions.
106
 Empirical projects attempt quantification. As is generally 
true of the empirical research described above, this work has proceeded 
without engaging with the content of the briefs. So, for example, one 
major study measures the influence of amicus curiae briefs
107
 primarily 
by assessing whether the presence of such briefs bears a relationship to 
the outcome in a case.
108
 Another researcher has conducted a number of 
studies in which he has focused on such factors as a lawyer‘s prior 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See id. at 1028. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See ROBERT M. HOWARD & JOSEPH L. SMITH, THE NEXT FRONTIER IN LEGAL 
ANALYSIS: COMPUTER-AIDED CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TEXTS 8–9 (2008), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36768599/Howard-Smith-APSA-08. 
 103. See id. at 8–12. 
 104. Id. at 8. 
 105. Id. at 14. 
 106. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students For Bashing Principals, 
Teachers & Classmates In Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now 
Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 247 (2009). 
 107. These are briefs that are not filed by the parties to the case, but rather by ―friends of 
the court‖—that is, groups that have an interest in the resolution of the legal issue before the 
court and that seek to provide the court with input on aspects of the issue beyond what the 
parties themselves are likely to provide. 
 108. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000). 
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experience having a case before the Supreme Court or the lawyer‘s 
performance at oral argument (the latter based on the grades that Justice 
Blackmun gave to the advocates who appeared before the Court while 
he was on it).
109
 
Two studies have used automated methods in an effort to measure 
the influence of briefs on the Supreme Court. In the first, Professor 
Pamela Corley used plagiarism software to compare the briefs with 
majority opinions issued in the 2002–2004 terms.110 She set the 
software to search for phrases of six words or more and text strings of 
100 characters or more, as well as to skip over citations and to identify 
phrases separated by up to two nonmatching words (so as to identify 
minor edits).
111
 The result of this inquiry was to reveal a surprising 
degree of overlap between briefs and opinions. ―The mean percentage 
of the majority opinion directly borrowing from the appellants‘ and 
respondents‘ briefs was 10.1 (standard deviation of 5.7) and 9.4 
(standard deviation of 5.4), respectively.‖112 In contrast, running the 
same comparison between thirty randomly selected opinions from her 
data set and the opinions in ten percent of the cases cited in those cases 
generated a mean plagiarism rate of 1.1%.
113
 Her further analyses 
revealed that opinions borrowed a greater percentage of briefs that she 
determined were of high quality or were ideologically compatible with 
the Court, or in cases that were not politically salient.
114
 Case 
complexity, in contrast, bore no relation to the level of borrowing.
115
 
Kevin McGuire and his colleagues used Wordscores to test the 
hypothesis that briefs to the Supreme Court will target the ―median 
Justice‖—that is, the Justice who is at the ideological center of the 
Court.
116
 Advocates will target this Justice because his vote will be 
necessary to win a majority of the Court, and as a consequence, they 
posit that opinions authored by the median Justice will be more likely to 
reflect the arguments made in the winning brief than will those authored 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: 
When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 
259, 263 (2007). In similar fashion, Epstein, Landes, and Posner examined the relationship 
between the results in Supreme Court cases and the questioning of counsel at oral argument. See 
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the 
Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 437 
(2010). 
 110. Corley, supra note 63, at 469. 
 111. Id. at 471. 
 112. Id. at 472. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 474. 
 115. Id. 
 116. KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, GEORG VANBERG & ALIXANDRA B. YANUS, TARGETING THE 
MEDIAN JUSTICE: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3–4 
(2011), available at http://www.unc.edu/%7Ekmcguire/papers/targeting_median.pdf. 
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by other Justices.
117
 Taking the insight one step further, they posited 
that the similarity between the majority opinion and the arguments in 
the winning brief should decrease in proportion to the authoring 
Justice‘s distance from the ideological median of the Court.118 Their 
results were consistent with these hypotheses. They found that, in 
general, opinions were more similar to the brief of the prevailing party 
than the losing party, and that, although their sample size was relatively 
small, ―there clearly appears to be [a] positive relationship between a 
justice‘s ideological proximity to the Court‘s median and the similarity 
of her opinions to the winning parties‘ briefs.‖119 
As we have suggested above, we believe that content analysis 
directed toward checking for correspondence among briefs and opinions 
would provide an at least partial answer to the concern that opinions do 
not accurately reflect either the facts of the cases being decided or the 
court‘s underlying decisional processes.120 It seems reasonable to expect 
that the degree of correspondence between opinions and briefs will, at 
least as a general matter, increase along with the extent to which 
opinions accurately reflect the facts and arguments actually presented in 
the underlying dispute. In our adversary system, the briefs in an 
appellate case are the primary conduit through which the court gets its 
information about the dispute, and the other information in the record 
appears there only as a product of the adversaries‘ efforts.121 Substantial 
departures are thus at least suggestive of the conclusion that the court is 
resolving what might be characterized as a different case than the one 
put before it. 
While the question of candor
122—the extent to which opinions 
reflect the court‘s true reasoning—is trickier, at the margins at least one 
would expect an opinion grounded in the arguments made by the parties 
to be an opinion that accurately reflects a decision actually grounded in 
those arguments and the authorities invoked in support of them. This 
will not be an absolute, or even necessarily strong, relationship. Most 
everyone would resist the notion that the content of documents is the 
sole determinative factor in a judicial decision.
123
 In many, perhaps 
most, cases the judge will bring her own understanding of an area of 
law to a case, as well as her own intuitions about what the correct 
decision is. As a result, things extraneous to the content of a brief will 
often matter, such as the subject matter of the case, the identity of the 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Id. at 3. 
 118. See id. at 6. 
 119. Id. at 13. 
 120. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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brief‘s author, the politics of the issues involved, the specific facts of a 
case, and so on, and may render the role the documents play relatively 
minor. There are differing intuitions as to the roles that judicial opinions 
should and do play in legal analysis. Although the official story is that 
judicial opinions provide a more or less accurate window into the 
rationale underlying a decision, the cynic would contend that opinions 
are merely after-the-fact efforts to give cover to a decision already 
made, possibly on other grounds, and that they do not reliably tell us 
anything useful about the process of judicial reasoning. 
II.  THE CASE FOR MEASURING JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS 
We have argued in the preceding Part that research comparing briefs 
and other litigation documents to judicial opinions holds the promise of 
ameliorating, at least partially, one of the methodological shortcomings 
of content analysis by enabling us to determine whether judicial 
opinions accurately reflect the cases they discuss. In this Part, we 
expand on that insight by discussing more specifically the measurement 
of what we call ―judicial responsiveness.‖ The discussion unfolds in two 
Sections. Section A justifies the measure by tracing out the contours of 
the normative case for responsiveness as a feature of legitimate 
adjudication. Although we attempt in this Article to remain agnostic 
concerning the ultimate validity of the normative case in its particulars, 
it nonetheless makes sense to outline it in order to develop an 
appreciation for the centrality of responsiveness to the adjudicative 
process. Section B considers measures of responsiveness as a useful 
window into larger efforts to study the judiciary. Information about the 
relative responsiveness of courts and judges can help inform both 
academic inquiry into the nature and processes of judging as well as 
research directed toward questions of institutional design.  
A.  Responsiveness as a Normatively Desirable Feature of Adjudication 
Lon Fuller argued, in his classic article The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, that the defining characteristic of adjudication lies not in 
the attributes of the judge, but rather in that it is a process based in 
reasoned argumentation.
124
 On this view, the key to legitimacy in 
adjudication is not whether the judge is impartial, learned in the law, or 
otherwise possessed of some specific attribute. Nor is it the case that 
one is engaged in ―adjudication‖ simply because one has resolved a 
dispute. Instead, Fuller contended, legitimate adjudication can take 
place only ―within an institutional framework that is intended to assure 
to the disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 363. 
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reasoned arguments.‖125 For Fuller, then, party participation in the 
decision making process is essential to legitimacy.  
Indeed, Fuller took the point a step further, arguing that legitimacy 
requires that the judge should strive to render a decision as completely 
as possible on the grounds the parties have argued.
126
 This is so, in part, 
for the simple reason that the parties would, if they knew that the judge 
were going to base his decision on some ground mentioned by a party in 
passing or not at all, address their arguments differently. But Fuller also 
suggested that something more fundamental is at work. The logic of a 
system that depends on party participation also demands that the 
resulting decisions be responsive to the specific contentions raised as 
part of that participation.
127
 While it may never be possible for a court 
to base its decision purely on what the parties have put before it, Fuller 
argued that  
this is no excuse for a failure to work toward an 
achievement of the closest approximation of it. We need to 
remind ourselves that if this congruence is utterly absent—
if the grounds for the decision fall completely outside the 
framework of the argument, making all that was discussed 
or proved at the hearing irrelevant—then the adjudicative 
process has become a sham, for the parties‘ participation in 
the decision has lost all meaning.
128
 
The idea that courts should base their decisions on the grounds offered 
by the parties has appeal beyond the realm of legal philosophy. To 
understate the point, practicing lawyers dislike it when courts resolve 
issues on grounds not raised by the parties, recharacterize the arguments 
raised by the parties, ignore certain arguments (or components of 
arguments), and the like.
129
 This animosity is perfectly understandable. 
The lawyer‘s role within the adversary system calls for the presentation 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 365. 
 126. See id. at 364. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. at 388. 
 129. One appellate advocate put the point as follows: 
Appellate advocates hope that the appellate court will address, somewhere 
in the opinion, all issues that the parties have raised. The failure to do so 
suggests that the court reviewed the matter so quickly that it missed an issue or 
saw the issue but then forgot to address it in the written opinion. This apparent 
lack of care undermines confidence in the outcome. It does so for both sides, 
although it is particularly difficult for the losing side to accept a decision when 
the court failed to discuss all issues. 
Mary Massaron Ross, Reflections on Appellate Courts: An Appellate Advocate’s Thoughts for 
Judges, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 355, 362 (2006). 
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of the best arguments that the lawyer can conjure up on his client‘s 
behalf. If he is the one pressing a claim, he has come up with what she 
understands to be the best grounds for concluding that that claim should 
be successful.
130
 A court‘s failure to engage with those grounds will be, 
at a minimum, disappointing. 
Of course, to say that the scope of judicial decision making should 
be driven primarily by the parties‘ arguments is not to say that it should 
be entirely so. There are reasons why a court can and should depart 
from strong responsiveness. As Professor Amanda Frost points out, 
courts‘ lawmaking responsibilities often counsel in favor of departing 
from the precise terms of the parties‘ arguments when necessary to 
preserve the coherence and integrity of legal standards.
131
 
Commentators such as Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss have observed 
that courts must sometimes account for the interests of parties who are 
not involved in the immediate lawsuit, but who will nonetheless be 
affected by its resolution.
132
 Even Fuller recognized that performance of 
the judicial role—indeed, what he recognized as exemplary 
performance—will occasionally involve the judge seeing things that the 
parties did not see, ―bring[ing] to clear expression thoughts that in lesser 
minds would have remained too vague and confused to serve as 
adequate guideposts for human conduct‖ or ―devis[ing] a solution that 
will reconcile and bring into harmony interests that were previously in 
conflict.‖133 At least in some instances, then, strong responsiveness 
might constitute a failing rather than a virtue, stemming from a lack of 
                                                                                                                     
 130. This is no doubt a somewhat idealized conception of the advocate‘s role. There are 
certainly some advocates who come to the court with a dispute the way one would approach a 
wise elder—that is, seeking insight from the court in addition to the application of logic. For 
example, in an argument a few years ago before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, counsel for a criminal defendant attempted an argument in the face of a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that he acknowledged was contrary to his position. See United States v. 
Johnson, 123 F. App‘x 240 (7th Cir. 2005). His pitch to the court, in substantial part, consisted 
of the expression of his hope that the court could find a way to distinguish the case. Audio of the 
argument is available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/J20L0KAH.mp3.  
 131. See Frost, supra note 9, at 501. 
 132. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1311–12 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms 
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1979). 
 133. Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1604, 1619 (1966). Though Fuller regards the judicial ideal as involving as little of the judge‘s 
predispositions as possible, he is under no illusions that reality can reflect this ideal: 
It would be foolish to assert that when judges are engaged in solving 
problems all of their personal attitudes and values become dissipated in a bright 
glow of objectivity. The final solution may well be skewed in one direction or 
another by something that may be termed a personal or collegial predilection. 
Id. 
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effort or imagination rather than exemplary performance of the judicial 
role. Across the run of cases, however, some relatively strong version of 
responsiveness would seem most consistent with prevailing conceptions 
of proper judging. 
B.  Responsiveness as a Window into Questions of Institutional Design 
and Process 
Quite apart from whether responsiveness is, in some relatively 
unqualified sense, necessary to legitimate adjudication, its study can 
benefit other strands of scholarly and practical inquiry. First, and at the 
most basic level, the study of responsiveness can help us to understand 
how the judiciary works. One might expect, for example, that courts at 
different levels of the judicial hierarchy would exhibit differing levels 
of responsiveness. Because courts have more responsibility for law 
development the farther one moves up the judicial hierarchy, research 
would likely show decreasing levels of responsiveness in higher courts. 
Such techniques might also enable studies assessing whether, as is often 
contended, caseload pressures have affected the manner in which judges 
do their work.
134
 Research examining briefs and opinions from different 
time periods might show that the relationship between courts and 
adversaries has changed as judges face greater workloads and have 
delegated increasing responsibility to law clerks.
135
 
In addition, large-scale implementation of a responsiveness measure 
will potentially provide results that can inform ongoing debates 
concerning the role of ideology in judicial decision making. Most of the 
quantitative empirical work focusing on the judiciary has been, and 
continues to be, of the sort that stems from the ―attitudinal‖ and 
―strategic‖ models of judging developed by political scientists.136 Stated 
generally, the focus of that work is on assessing the correlation and 
potential causal relationship between judges‘ ideological preferences 
and their decision making.
137
 Many in the legal academy (and in the 
legal world more broadly) have resisted that work‘s suggestion that 
ideology drives decision making, and have sought to demonstrate that 
more traditionally legal factors explain the bulk of judicial behavior.
138
 
                                                                                                                     
 134. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 274–75. 
 135. For an overview of both phenomena and consideration of the potential consequences, 
see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 124–59 (1996) 
[hereinafter POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS]. 
 136. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 30, at 312–26 (evaluating the attitudinal model); LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10–11 (1998) (reviewing the strategic 
model). 
 137. See id. at 10. 
 138. For a discussion of these critiques, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in 
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 737–39 (2009). 
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Assessments of responsiveness would potentially shed further light on 
this debate, at least insofar as one accepts the proposition that a highly 
responsive decision is less likely to be the product of ideology than a 
relatively unresponsive decision. In this regard our work dovetails with 
prior work done by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, who investigated for 
political bias in judges‘ citation practices.139 Their working theory was 
that judges have considerable freedom in choosing what authorities to 
cite, such that a federal circuit judge‘s choice to cite an opinion 
authored by a judge from another circuit might reveal underlying biases 
that the result-focused inquiry of most empirical research might 
overlook.
140
 Our theory is that the extent to which a judge exercises that 
freedom by citing authorities other than those relied upon by the parties 
also tells us something significant about that judge‘s tendencies. A 
judge who focuses primarily on the authorities offered by the parties 
arguably leaves less room for her ideological or other biases to manifest 
themselves. 
Second, assessments of responsiveness can inform more 
normatively oriented scholarship, such as debates over questions of 
process and institutional design. For example, a key component of the 
debate over the device of the ―unpublished‖ opinion is the suggestion 
that such opinions are justifiable because they involve the creation of no 
law, and thus need only to speak to the parties. A measure of 
responsiveness would allow for assessment of whether unpublished 
opinions actually are, as this justification suggests, relatively more 
focused on the parties‘ contentions than their published counterparts.141 
A measure of responsiveness also might be added to the mix of 
factors employed in recent efforts to assess judicial quality, and could 
serve as a basis for comparisons of courts and individual judges. 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (As a 
Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2007). 
 140. See id. at 1286–87. 
 141. It might also reveal that the nature of the responsiveness that appears in unpublished 
opinions is different from that in published opinions. As one commentator has articulated the 
justifications: 
A principal justification for unpublished rulings is that they take less time to 
prepare than do published opinions. An extensive opinion is said not to be 
needed if the law to be applied is straightforward or if a case is heavily fact-
specific and thus is of minimal or narrower applicability. Because unpublished 
opinions are primarily directed to the parties rather than a larger audience, the 
statement of facts, which are known to the parties, can be truncated. Also, the 
law need not be elaborated, with only enough analysis provided to demonstrate 
to the parties that consideration has been given to the legal issues. 
Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the 
Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 333–34 (2001). 
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Perhaps the most prominent example of the recent work on judicial 
quality is a series of articles by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, in which 
they endeavor to evaluate the performance of federal appeals court 
judges.
142
 Choi and Gulati based their evaluation on a combination of 
measures designed to assess productivity, quality, and independence, 
including, respectively, the number of opinions written by each judge, 
the frequency with which each judge‘s opinions are cited by other 
judges, and the extent to which each judge disagreed with her 
colleagues who were appointed by presidents from the same party.
143
 
Choi and Gulati‘s work generated a significant response.144 
Although many commentators were generally positive about the idea of 
attempting to assess judicial quality empirically, most also offered up 
critiques of the methodology. Some of these critiques paralleled those 
directed at ideologically focused work—for example, that there are 
qualitative dimensions to judging that simply cannot be captured by 
quantitative measures.
145
 Other critics emphasized what they perceived 
as incompleteness in the measures, whether because they regarded the 
specific phenomena that Choi and Gulati investigated as not sufficiently 
reflective of the underlying traits they attempted to measure,
146
 or more 
generally on grounds that Choi and Gulati‘s set of underlying traits 
provided an incomplete picture of judicial quality.
147
 Coupled with 
these assertions of incompleteness is the concern that quantitative 
measurement of judicial quality will skew judicial behavior, as judges 
work to maximize their performance along the measured dimensions, 
perhaps to the detriment of the less easily quantifiable aspects of 
effective judging.
148
 
Finally, this line of research may yield insights that are useful to 
practicing lawyers, and to those who teach advocacy. One can imagine, 
for example, large-scale analysis of the relationships among briefs and 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the 
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2005); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing 
the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 23 (2004); Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299 
(2004). 
 143. See Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 142, at 305–10. 
 144. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1383, 1384–85 (2009). The work also served as the focal point for a symposium issue of the 
Florida State University Law Review. See Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of 
Judicial Performance: An Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 
(2005). 
 145. Gey & Rossi, supra note 144, at 1004. 
 146. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 144, at 1388–93. 
 147. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 
1389, 1397–98 (2005) (criticizing specifically Choi and Gulati‘s technique for undermining the 
rule of law, excluding certain variables, and lacking transparency). 
 148. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 144, at 1395–96. 
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opinions generating information about the relative utility of briefing 
practices and approaches. It may tell us something about whether reply 
briefs matter, or whether response briefs should place relatively greater 
emphasis on engaging with the opponent‘s arguments or developing 
their own. It could also facilitate quantitative assessment of lawyering 
skills, such as enabling assessment of the relative quality of public 
defenders and private counsel in criminal appeals, or comparisons of 
specialists and non-specialists. 
III.  AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF RESPONSIVENESS IN THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT 
Despite the potential payoffs, the concept of judicial responsiveness 
remains understudied—especially so if one regards it as central to the 
entire endeavor of adjudication. One of us has in previous work 
explored various dimensions of courts‘ responsiveness obligations, 
ranging from an effort to define the contours of those obligations (with 
the failure to meet them constituting ―judicial inactivism‖)149 to the 
exploration of various ways in which judicial processes and structures 
create or fail to create incentives for courts to be responsive.
150
 
Underlying this work is an understanding that courts often fall short of 
Fuller‘s ideal, even when that ideal is moderated to take account of 
other legitimate considerations that might drive judicial behavior away 
from its fully responsive version. Yet, as is characteristic of much legal 
scholarship touching on the judicial process, that understanding is based 
largely on anecdotal evidence derived from personal experience, lore 
gathered from lawyers, and the occasional judicial admission that things 
occasionally get swept under the rug (always by other judges, of 
course).
151
 To date, no one has rigorously investigated the extent to 
which courts and judges are responsive to the advocacy before them. 
There are at least two reasons for this lack of developed evidence. 
One is that the necessary information has historically been difficult to 
obtain. Court opinions have been readily available at least since the rise 
of West Publishing, but only recently has it become easy to access 
electronic versions of the briefs submitted in a large range of cases. The 
second is that measuring judicial responsiveness, as is the case with 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism, supra note 8, at 123. 
 150. See Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism, supra note 11, at 749–58. 
 151. See, e.g., POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 135, at 165 (noting that ―the 
unpublished opinion provides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues under the rug in 
cases where a one-liner would be too blatant an evasion of judicial duty‖); Patricia M. Wald, 
The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 
1374 (1995) (―I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision 
incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public debate about 
what law controls.‖). 
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―thick‖ measures of judicial output more generally,152 is, as noted 
above, both labor intensive and subject to concerns about coding 
reliability. This Part reports the methodology and results of our initial 
efforts to employ automated methods to assess responsiveness in a 
sample of cases from the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 
A.  The Sample of Cases 
We analyzed a sample of thirty cases in which opinions were issued 
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004 (the specific cases are 
listed in the Appendix). The sample was selected from the total set of 
such cases decided by the First Circuit in 2004 via a two-step process. 
First, we identified the cases for which briefs from both parties were 
available on Westlaw.
153
 That returned a list of ninety-seven cases.
154
 
Second, we selected every third case to analyze, except where the case 
that would otherwise be selected was inappropriate (such as, for 
example, where it involved third parties), in which case we moved to 
the next case and resumed the pattern of selecting every third case.
155
 Of 
the thirty opinions in the sample, twenty-seven are ―published‖ 
opinions, and twenty-one affirmed the lower court‘s ruling.156 The 
briefing in fifteen of the cases included a reply brief; the other fifteen 
                                                                                                                     
 152. It is a problem that pervades the assessment of judicial output more generally. 
Because it is so difficult to assess the quality of a judicial decision, we tend to place a lot of 
emphasis on process and on qualities of the judge such as impartiality. See Evans et al., supra 
note 7, at 1010; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 3 (2008). 
 153. More specifically, the subset is limited to cases in which there is a primary brief from 
each party and at most one reply brief. Excluded were cases in which there were amicus briefs, 
cases involving more than two parties, and cases in which more than one reply brief was filed. 
Once the methodology is perfected, these sorts of variations would make good independent 
variables in a sufficiently large study. 
 154. Our query to West resulted in a partially satisfactory explanation for how it is that the 
briefs for some cases but not for others are available: 
Some reasons include: (1) Access—some courts will not provide us with briefs 
to certain cases, for various reasons. For briefs that the courts have online, this 
is the primary reason why we do not have every brief. (2) Availability—some 
briefs (especially older briefs) are not available through the courts online. (3) 
Resources—for some briefs that are not available online, West would (and may 
still) send someone to the court to scan copies of briefs for later addition to 
Westlaw; in many courts it would be too time consuming to copy every brief 
they had on file. 
That doesn‘t clarify much, but it‘s clear that the subset of this set of cases for which both briefs 
are available on Westlaw is a nonrandom sample. E-mail from Matthew Singewald, Academic 
Account Manger, West, a Thomson-Reuters Co. (June 2, 2009, 11:41 CST) (on file with 
author).  
 155. The result is that this, too, is a nonrandom sample. 
 156. We coded an opinion as an affirmance only when it affirmed the lower court‘s 
decision in all respects. All other results were coded as reversals. 
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did not. Because the sample of cases for which Westlaw makes briefs 
available is presumably nonrandom (as is our subset of that sample), we 
recognize that it is inappropriate to attempt to generalize from our 
findings to any conclusions about the responsiveness of the First Circuit 
across a broader range of cases. We do, however, contend that this 
sample of cases provides a basis for testing the validity of the measures 
of responsiveness that we proposed. 
B.  Assessment One—Manual Coding 
The first stage of our analysis of our sample of cases involved 
manual content analysis and coding. That proceeded as follows. With 
respect to each of the thirty cases, we first assessed the arguments made 
by the parties. This involved drawing on the statement of issues, 
summary of argument, and argument sections of each brief, with the 
focus on identifying the thrust of the argument and the principal 
authorities upon which the parties relied. After doing this for both 
parties‘ briefs, the next step entailed a comparison of the issues, 
arguments, and authority presented by the parties in their briefs to the 
issues, arguments, and authority discussed by the court in its opinion. 
Although this assessment necessarily required the exercise of judgment, 
it involved some relatively concrete steps such as searching the opinions 
for specific words and phrases, as well as citations to authority that 
played a prominent role in the parties‘ briefs. 
The next step was to categorize the opinion in terms of its 
responsiveness to the issues and arguments presented by the parties. We 
broke responsiveness down into three basic categories into which the 
court‘s analysis with respect to each issue in its opinion could be 
placed:
157
 
(i) Strongly responsive—A strongly responsive analysis 
addresses the issues on the parties‘ terms, relies almost 
exclusively on the universe of authority they present, and 
grapples with the arguments they make. A strongly 
responsive analysis thus proceeds from the same 
fundamental conception of the nature of the issue as is held 
by the parties and manifests itself in an opinion that the 
parties would regard as having fully addressed their proofs 
and arguments. 
An example of an opinion coded as strongly responsive is 
Redondo Construction Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway & 
                                                                                                                     
 157. The theoretical justification for these categories can be found in Oldfather, Defining 
Judicial Inactivism, supra note 8, at 164, 168–75 & n.202. 
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Transportation Authority.
158
 The defendant Authority 
appealed the district court‘s denial of its claim of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as an arm of the state.
159
 The parties 
regarded the case as being governed by the court‘s decision 
in a prior case,
160
 and the court accepted that conception of 
the dispute and engaged in an analysis that falls within the 
parameters created by the parties‘ arguments and 
positions.
161
 In all, the process maps out fairly well onto 
idealized notions of what the appellate process should look 
like. 
A case that is less a classic example of the appellate 
process but that is still coded as being strongly responsive 
is Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.,
162
 which was an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of an 
employer on a claim that plaintiff was fired for having a 
disability.
163
 The trial court based the grant of summary 
judgment on its conclusion that there was no evidence 
based on which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that 
the plaintiff was fired for having a disability, rather than 
based on the defendant‘s rational belief that the plaintiff 
possessed alcohol and was intoxicated on the job.
164
 The 
appellant contested that ruling on the trial court‘s terms.165 
The appellee addressed that argument, and also offered an 
alternative ground for affirming the trial court.
166
 The First 
Circuit based its affirmance on the alternative ground.
167
 
Despite the fact that the appellant did not file a reply brief, 
and consequently did not address the alternative ground, 
the opinion was coded as strongly responsive because the 
court did not depart from the framework put before it by 
the litigants. 
(ii) Weakly responsive—In a weakly responsive analysis, 
the court addresses the parties‘ arguments, but offers a 
justification for its decision that departs in some 
                                                                                                                     
 158. 357 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 159. Id. at 125. 
 160. Id. at 126 (citing Fresnius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico & the 
Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 161. See id. at 126–28. 
 162. 358 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 163. Id. at 114. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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meaningful way from strong responsiveness. Weak 
responsiveness can manifest itself in differing forms, 
including the following: 
(a) The court might recast the proofs and arguments of 
the parties, as by, for example, reaching a conclusion 
about the significance of a precedent or authority that 
departs from those proposed by the parties. For example, 
in Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
Bedrijfsrevisoren,
168
 the court, in considering the 
standards to be employed in considering whether to 
grant an injunction concerning an international 
proceeding, read a pair of cases discussed by the parties 
to require a ―gatekeeping inquiry‖ that neither party had 
identified.
169
 In this situation the analysis is strongly 
responsive except insofar as the court uses the 
authorities provided by the parties to step outside the 
parameters of the argument that the parties have set. 
(b) The court might rely on additional authority in 
reaching its decision, apart from the authorities that the 
parties identify as governing the case. Here again, the 
court‘s analysis might generally be strongly responsive, 
but for its resort to some authority not identified by 
either of the parties in support of a material portion of its 
analysis. For example, in Correia v. Hall,
170
 the court 
considered, among other claims, a habeas petitioner‘s 
argument that the trial judge‘s comments during trial 
suggested pique at the petitioner‘s decision to demand a 
jury trial, and rejected the argument based on authority 
that neither party had cited.
171
 
(c) The court might rely on alternative authority, 
addressing the issue on the same general terms that the 
parties have identified, but concluding that its resolution 
is governed by an authority that neither party has 
identified. An example here is Gulf Coast Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Reder,
172
 in which the defendant-appellant argued 
                                                                                                                     
 168. 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 169. Id. at 18; see also Brief for Appellant Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-2704); Brief for Appellee Quaak v. 
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-2704). 
 170. 364 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 171. Id. at 391–92; see also Brief for Appellant Correia v. Hall, 364 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 
2004); Brief for Appellee Correia v. Hall, 364 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1203). 
 172. 355 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff‘s motion 
for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
173
 The parties argued 
over whether the standard to be applied to a Rule 12(c) 
motion is the same as that applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.
174
 The court, in concluding that the Rule 56 
summary judgment standard applied, relied on a case 
that neither party cited.
175
 Here, although the court 
stayed within the broad parameters of the issue on which 
the parties focused, its invocation of alternative 
authority resulted in an analysis that tends more toward 
a nonresponsive, sua sponte resolution than toward 
strong responsiveness. 
One should note that the three subcategories identified 
above can be regarded as involving increasingly greater 
departures from strong responsiveness. A court that recasts 
the authority relied upon by the parties remains within the 
contours of the dispute as the parties conceive of it, while a 
court that relies on additional authority has stepped outside 
of that framework. A court that relies on alternative 
authority has, in turn, taken an additional step outside the 
parameters set by the parties. The court in each instance 
resolves what can still be characterized as the same issue, 
but in a way that departs in an increasingly significant way 
from the framework within which the parties have 
presented the case. 
(iii) Nonresponsive—A court‘s analysis can be 
nonresponsive in two primary ways. First, it could resolve 
the case based on issues and authorities not presented by 
the parties, as by raising sua sponte what the court 
concludes is a dispositive issue. Second, the court could 
simply fail to address an issue. The only case in our sample 
that was coded as entirely nonresponsive was Olick v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
176
 a two-paragraph 
unpublished, per curiam opinion that characterizes the 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Id. at 37. 
 174. See Brief for Appellant at 10 Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Reder, 355 F.3d 35 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1963); Brief for Appellee at 4 Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Reder, 355 
F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1963). 
 175. Gulf Coast, 355 F.3d at 38; see also Brief for Appellant Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Reder, 355 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1963); Brief for Appellee Gulf Coast Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Reder, 355 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1963). 
 176. 106 F. App‘x 736 (1st Cir. 2004).  
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/2
2012] TRIANGULATING JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS 1225 
 
appellant‘s motions as partly moot (a contention that does 
not appear in the appellee‘s brief),177 and to the extent not 
moot, then ―misplaced.‖178 While a charitable interpretation 
of the opinion would be that it provides evidence of the 
court‘s engagement with the parties‘ arguments, that 
interpretation requires drawing substantial inferences about 
the court‘s reasoning process, and the opinion itself does 
not reflect the sort of responsiveness envisioned by Fuller. 
As the discussion suggests, the concept of responsiveness as it manifests 
itself in any given opinion tends to be nuanced and multifaceted. 
Particularly within the category of weak responsiveness it is not unusual 
to see an analysis of a single issue in which the court departs from 
strong responsiveness in more than one way. There is, without question, 
considerable reductionism involved in placing the analysis of a specific 
issue within a single category, and the categories themselves suggest 
brighter lines than reality provides. To the extent that it is even 
appropriate to consider responsiveness as merely a one-dimensional 
concept, it undoubtedly ought to be regarded as continuous rather than a 
discrete variable. But efforts to code it in that fashion would only 
magnify the concerns about reliability discussed above. 
Finally, we also coded for the extent to which the court provided 
elaboration of its analysis underlying the resolution of each issue it 
decided. Conceptually, although it is not simply a measure of length, 
elaboration is meant to capture an aspect of the opinions that is more 
quantitative than responsiveness.
179
 But there is undoubtedly some 
overlap. We placed the court‘s analysis of each issue into one of four 
categories: (1) full elaboration, which tends toward an idealized form of 
appellate decision making, in which the court provides a factual 
background and relatively detailed explanation of its analysis, including 
reference to and further analysis of applicable authorities; (2) mixed 
elaboration, in which the court departs in a material way from full 
elaboration, yet provides more than a summary disposition of an issue 
coupled with a citation to authority; (3) minimal elaboration, in which 
the court provides at most a cursory discussion of the issue, coupled 
with a citation to authority and a conclusory assertion that the authority 
resolves the issue; and (4) no elaboration, in which the court either fails 
to speak to the issue at all or simply asserts its resolution with no 
citation to authority. Though perhaps to a lesser extent than is true of 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See Brief for Appellee Olick v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F. App‘x 736 
(1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-2350). 
 178. Olick, 106 F. App‘x at 738. 
 179. For a more complete definition, see Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism, supra 
note 8, at 164, 175–80. 
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the responsiveness determination, characterizing the nature of a court‘s 
elaboration with respect to its elaboration of a given issue likewise 
involves the exercise of some judgment. 
C.  Assessments Two and Three—Automated Content Analysis and 
Coding 
We investigated two types of automated approaches for 
quantification of responsiveness. These methods differ in the types of 
evidence considered. One approach uses the textual content of a case‘s 
opinion and briefs. This method estimates responsiveness by the cosine 
similarity between opinion and brief documents. This widely used 
document-similarity measure has been successfully applied to document 
classification, information retrieval, and other natural language 
processing tasks.
180
 The second approach is based on citation patterns in 
the opinion and briefs. Both methods involve measuring various aspects 
of the overlap among the documents. 
We preprocessed all brief and opinion hypertext documents in our 
corpus in the same way. We first extracted the text and citations. A 
document‘s citations are the external addresses referenced in anchor 
tags, which appear in browsers as clickable links. Because Westlaw 
provides links only for other materials available within Westlaw, a 
small percentage of citations will not be extracted. Since for 
typographic reasons the Westlaw encoding often has multiple anchor 
tags for the same citation instance, we disregarded citation occurrence 
quantities. That is, for purposes of subsequent processing we only 
recorded which citations are present and absent in a given document. A 
document‘s text can be thought of as the words that are visible when the 
hypertext document is viewed in a web browser. We eliminated 
typographic markup—for example, font size and italics—and tokenized 
the document into a word sequence. We defined a word to be a 
contiguous string of alphanumeric (a–z, A–Z, 0–9) or underscore (_) 
characters. We converted all words to lowercase and stem words to their 
roots using Porter‘s method.181 
After all documents were processed as described, we removed 
common or so-called ―stop‖ words, which we assume are 
uninformative. We define a stop word to be any stemmed word present 
in at least one brief or opinion of all thirty cases. The remaining 
stemmed non-stop words, which we refer to as ―terms,‖ make up the 
corpus vocabulary. The vocabularies of the ―argument only‖ and 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See, e.g., RADA MIHALCEA ET AL., AM. ASS‘N FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, CORPUS-
BASED AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED MEASURES OF TEXT SEMANTIC SIMILARITY (2006), available at 
http://www.cse.unt.edu/~rada/papers/mihalcea.aaai06.pdf. 
 181. See M.F. Porter, An Algorithm for Suffix Stripping, 14 PROGRAM 130 (1980). 
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―argument + facts‖ corpora (described below) comprise 9,442 and 
10,422 terms, respectively. 
To compute similarity we first represented each document by its 
―term frequency, inverse-document frequency‖ (TF-IDF) vector, a 
common and useful representation for text processing tasks.
182
 TF-IDF 
represents a document as a vector whose length is equal to the number 
of terms in the vocabulary.
183
 Thus, each term t is associated with one 
dimension in the TF-IDF vector. Let xA be the TF-IDF vector of 
document A. Then, element xA(t), which denotes the importance of term 
t to document A, is the product of a term-frequency factor and an 
inverse-document frequency factor: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cosine similarity between documents A and B is the cosine of the 
angle between their TF-IDF vectors xA and xB. 
To compute similarity based on citation patterns, we generated a 
score indicating the percentage of authorities that were cited in the 
opinion that were also cited in the brief or set of briefs noted, which we 
designate as ―% Responsive.‖ We also generated a score indicating the 
percentage of authorities cited in the brief or set of briefs in question 
that were also cited in the opinion, which we designate as ―% 
Responded.‖ 
We applied these techniques to the opinions and three versions of 
the briefs. The three versions of the briefs were: (1) the entire 
document, including tables of authorities and contents, as well as West-
generated front and back matter; (2) versions from which the tables of 
contents and authorities, as well as any sections pertaining to the court‘s 
jurisdiction (which was not in controversy in any of the cases), were 
removed, as was all West-generated front and back matter; and (3) 
versions including only the standard of review and argument sections 
(including any sections designated as a summary of argument). The 
                                                                                                                     
 182. GERARD SALTON & MICHAEL J. MCGILL, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL 30, 63 (1983). For a general overview of stemming, TF-IDF, and other natural 
language processing issues, see generally CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION 
TO INFORMATION RETRIEVAL (2009).  
 183. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 182, at 119. 
x 
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primary difference between the second and third versions was the 
removal of the statement of facts. 
D.  Results and Analysis 
1.  Manual Coding 
Our primary purpose in manually coding the documents was to 
generate a baseline by which to assess the validity of our automated 
assessments. Even so, the results are interesting in their own right. 
Because the cases varied in terms of the number of issues presented, we 
coded each issue presented individually, and assigned responsiveness 
scores to cases by averaging the scores across all the issues. The court 
considered sixty-two issues over the thirty cases. Broken down in terms 
of the overall responsiveness of the analysis, the distribution of how the 
issues were considered is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Breakdown of Responsiveness—All Issues 
Opinion Type 
Strongly 
Responsive 
Weakly 
Responsive 
Nonresponsive 
Published 16 33 7 
Unpublished 1 1 4 
 
Considering only the thirty-four issues as to which the court‘s 
analysis was weakly responsive to the parties‘ contentions, the types of 
weak responsiveness in which the court engaged is displayed in Table 2 
(note that the total is greater than thirty-four because for some issues the 
analysis fell into two categories). 
Table 2: Subcategories of Weak Responsiveness 
Alternative 
Authority 
Additional 
Authority 
Recasted 
Authority 
23 8 7 
 
We used two alternative methods for scoring cases for responsiveness. 
In the first, which we will call categorical responsiveness (CR), we 
assigned a score of 1, 2, or 3 for each issue as to which the court‘s 
analysis was coded as, respectively, nonresponsive, weakly responsive, 
and strongly responsive. Summary statistics for categorical 
responsiveness appear in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Categorical Responsiveness (CR) 
 
Percentiles Smallest 
  
1% 1 1 
  
5% 1.4 1.4 
  
10% 1.5 1.5 Obs 30 
25% 2 1.5 Sum of Wgt. 30 
    
 
50% 2 
 
Mean 2.257333 
  
Largest Std. Dev. .5830002 
75% 3 3 
  
90% 3 3 Variance .3398892 
95% 3 3 Skewness -.1002565 
99% 3 3 Kurtosis 2.054464 
 
 
Our second method, which we will call incremental responsiveness 
(IR), involved assigning different values to the different forms of weak 
responsiveness, as discussed above. This entailed use of a five-point 
scale, with values of 1 through 5 assigned to nonresponsiveness and 
strong responsiveness, respectively. Within the category of weak 
responsiveness, we assigned the value 2 to issues where the court relied 
on alternative authority, 3 to issues for which the court relied on 
authority in addition to that offered by the parties, and 4 to issues with 
respect to which the court relied on the authority provided by the parties 
but recast that authority. The underlying assumption, as discussed 
above, is that the ordering of this coding reflects in a rough way the 
relative extent of their departures from strong responsiveness. Summary 
statistics for incremental responsiveness appear in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Incremental Responsiveness (IR) 
 
Percentiles Smallest 
  
1% 1 1 
  
5% 1.4 1.4 
  
10% 1.75 1.5 Obs 30 
25% 2 2 Sum of Wgt. 30 
     
50% 3 
 
Mean 3.257667 
  
Largest Std. Dev. 1.315847 
75% 5 5 
  
90% 5 5 Variance 1.731453 
95% 5 5 Skewness 0.1100383 
99% 5 5 Kurtosis 1.66367 
 
 
We also assigned scores based on how cases were coded for 
elaboration, scoring 4 for full elaboration, and 3, 2, and 1, respectively, 
for mixed, minimal, and no elaboration. Summary statistics for 
elaboration appear in Table 5. As was the case with responsiveness, 
elaboration scores for cases involving more than one issue were 
generated by averaging the scores for all issues. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Elaboration 
 
Percentiles Smallest 
  
1% 1 1 
  
5% 1.25 1.25 
  
10% 1.4 1.4 Obs 30 
25% 2 1.4 
Sum of 
Wgt. 
30 
  
 
  
50% 2.5 
 
Mean 2.401667 
  
Largest Std. Dev. .7057013 
75% 3 3 
  
90% 3 3 Variance .4980144 
95% 3 3 Skewness -0.094912 
99% 4 4 Kurtosis 2.386428 
 
2.  Document Similarity 
As noted above, we applied our automated coding methodologies to 
three versions of the briefs. The averages, ranges, and standard 
deviations of the document similarity scores are depicted in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Averages, Ranges, and Standard Deviations of Document 
Similarity Scores 
Version of 
Briefs 
Appellant 
Briefs to 
Opinion 
Appellee 
Briefs to 
Opinion 
Reply 
Briefs to 
Opinion 
Appellant 
+ Reply 
Brief to 
Opinion 
All Briefs 
to Opinion 
Appellant 
+ Reply 
Briefs to 
Appellee 
Briefs 
Entire 
Document 
68.6 
27.1 – 86.6 
StD: 11.8 
70.4 
50.3 – 90.6 
StD: 10.5 
56.3 
17.9 – 77.9 
StD: 14.2 
67.1 
23.5 – 84.8 
StD: 14.9 
73.1 
34.5 – 90.5 
StD: 11.4 
76.7 
49 – 90.2 
StD: 10.5 
Facts + 
Argument 
68.6 
28.4 – 86.3 
StD: 12.1 
70.1 
42.4 – 90.6 
StD: 11.0 
58.7 
17.9 – 77.5 
StD: 14.7 
67.9 
24.3 – 85 
StD: 15.2 
73.5 
35.9 – 88.7 
StD: 11.1 
74.5 
38.9 – 90.2 
StD: 12.0 
Argument 
Only 
70.0 
37.0 – 88.6 
StD: 11.1 
70.6 
39.7 – 89.4 
StD: 11.1 
60.9 
30.9 – 77.6 
StD: 12.6 
69.0 
34.6 – 86.5 
StD: 13.6 
75.6 
46.5 – 88.5 
StD: 9.9 
71.5 
35.3 – 90.2 
StD: 12.3 
 
These numbers demonstrate that excising portions of the briefs had 
surprisingly little effect on document similarity scores. Even so, we 
have chosen to conduct our analysis using the similarity scores 
generated using the briefs edited to include the arguments only. We 
base this decision on our intuition that the argument sections of the 
briefs will contain the key components of the parties‘ arguments 
(including references to those facts that they deem significant), coupled 
with the suggestion in the data implying that set of similarity scores 
captures both greater responsiveness and a greater disjunction between 
the two sides‘ arguments. 
3.  Citation Analysis 
Working with the versions of the briefs referenced above in which 
all portions other than argument sections were excised, we assessed the 
relationship between the briefs and the opinions in terms of authorities 
upon which both relied. For both the ―%Responsive‖ and 
―%Responded‖ measures discussed above, Table 7 shows the averages, 
ranges, and standard deviations of these scores. 
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Table 7. Averages, Ranges, and Standard Deviations of Citation 
Analysis Similarity Scores 
Appellant 
Brief–
%Responsive 
Appellant 
Brief–
%Responded 
Reply Brief–
%Responsive 
Reply Brief–
%Responded 
Appellant + 
Reply–
%Responsive 
Appellant + 
Reply–
%Responded 
18.2 
0.0 – 53.3 
StD: 13.2 
22.9 
0.0 – 78.6 
StD: 21.6 
16.4 
0.0 – 57.1 
StD: 18.4 
24.6 
0.0 – 66.7 
StD: 27.0 
23.6 
0.0 – 57.1 
StD: 15.4 
20.0 
0.0 – 50.0 
StD: 16.7 
Appellee 
Brief–
%Responsive 
Appellee 
Brief–
%Responded 
All Briefs–
%Responsive 
All Briefs–
%Responded 
  
26.6 
0.0 – 68.4 
StD: 16.8 
20.4 
0.0 – 59.1 
StD: 14.2 
35.0 
0.0 – 68.4 
StD: 16.8 
16.3 
0.0 – 41.7 
StD: 11.1 
  
4.  Analysis 
a.  The Viability of Automated Assessments of Responsiveness 
Our primary goal in this Part is to explore the general question of 
whether automated content analysis can effectively substitute for human 
assessment of the relationship among briefs and opinions and, more 
specifically, the viability of our two automated methodologies as 
approaches to the study of judicial responsiveness. The results are 
encouraging. Although room for refinement remains, our investigation 
demonstrates that relatively basic methods of analyzing document 
similarity can provide insight, across a run of cases, into whether a court 
consistently and deeply engages with cases on the terms in which the 
parties have argued them. In addition, some of our specific findings are 
interesting in their own right, and suggest avenues for further study.  
One of the virtues of an automated approach is that it maximizes 
reliability.
184
 Our task, then, is to establish that document similarity 
scores and citation analysis similarity scores serve as valid measures of 
responsiveness.
185
 In this regard there is, we believe, considerable 
intuitive appeal to both measures. Documents grappling with the same 
proofs and arguments seem likely to use the same words, such that one 
would expect considerable overlap among the briefs and opinion in a 
case where the parties and the court approach the same issue in 
fundamentally the same way. In cases where the parties and the court 
have differing ideas about what is at stake, in contrast, one would 
                                                                                                                     
 184.  ―Reliability is concerned with questions of stability and consistency—does the same 
measurement tool yield stable and consistent results when repeated over time.‖ QMSS e-
Lessons: Validity and Reliability, COLUMBIA CTR. FOR NEW MEDIA TEACHING AND LEARNING, 
http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/qmss/measurement/validity_and_reliability.html (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2012). 
 185.  ―Validity refers to the extent we are measuring what we hope to measure (and what 
we think we are measuring).‖ Id. 
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expect to find greater divergence in word usage. Thus, it seems probable 
that, to use something of an extreme example, a case in which the court 
raises sua sponte an issue that it determines is dispositive of the entire 
case will be a case in which there is relatively little overlap between the 
words used in the briefs and the words used in the opinions. In short, a 
responsive opinion would seem likely to have a higher textual similarity 
score when compared to the briefs than would a nonresponsive opinion. 
And while there will undoubtedly be individual instances in which that 
is not the case—because, for example, a court disposes of the entire 
case based on its resolution of a single issue and thereby renders the 
remaining issues moot—these expectations seem reasonable when 
applied to opinions in the aggregate. 
In similar fashion, it seems likely that legal documents engaged with 
the same doctrines and arguments will refer to the same authorities. 
Indeed, since authorities are at the very core of the sorts of ―proofs and 
arguments‖ that Fuller referred to,186 and thus are at the very core of the 
responsiveness that he placed at the center of adjudicative legitimacy, a 
court‘s resort to the same authorities as relied upon by the parties seems 
almost necessarily to be coextensive with a responsive analysis. Put in 
terms of the simple example we used above, if the parties and the court 
all conceive of the case as governed by Smith v. Jones, then one would 
expect the briefs and opinions to refer to Smith v. Jones and other cases 
and materials concerning the scope and proper application of Smith v. 
Jones.
187
 
Our manual coding of the thirty cases in our sample allows us to 
assess these measures of responsiveness based on more than mere 
intuition. Using Stata,
188
 we calculated the pairwise correlation 
(Pearson) of all variables. Since we compute p-values for a number of 
different correlations, we must be mindful of multiple hypothesis testing 
issues when testing for statistical significance. We assessed statistical 
significance of observed p-values in the context of multiple hypotheses 
using quantile–quantile (Q–Q) plots. Figure 8 shows the Q–Q plot of p-
values from correlations of responsiveness scores of the ―argument 
only‖ documents with the manually coded responsiveness scores. We 
have four types of briefs (appellant, appellee, appellant+reply and 
appellant+reply+appellee), and three kinds of responsiveness measures 
(%Responsive, %Responded, and cosine similarity), which provide a 
total of twelve measures of responsiveness. For each of these twelve 
measures we computed correlations and p-values with our two manual 
responsiveness codes (MR and IR), yielding the twenty-four p-values 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Fuller, supra note 8, at 367. 
 187. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 188. Stata is a popular statistical software package. See STATA, http://stata.com (last visited 
June 4, 2012). 
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plotted in the figure. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation we 
would expect the observed p-values to lie close to the diagonal line 
from (0,0) to (1,1). As eleven of the twenty-four p-values are < 0.05 and 
five of the twenty-four are < 0.01, we clearly observe substantial 
deviation from the diagonal, and thus conclude that the deviations of the 
observed correlations from 0.0 are statistically significant. 
Figure 8: Correlations with Manually Coded Responsiveness Scores 
 
Among the correlations with a p-value of .05 or less are those for the 
relationships set forth in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Correlations with p-value < .05 
Variable 1 Variable 2 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
Incremental 
Responsiveness 
Appellee 
Briefs/Opinion 
Textual Similarity 
0.44 0.0150 
Incremental 
Responsiveness 
Appellant+Reply 
Briefs/Appellee 
Briefs Textual 
Similarity 
0.37 0.0414 
Categorical 
Responsiveness
189
 
All Briefs–
%Responsive 
Citation Similarity 
0.63 0.0002 
Incremental 
Responsiveness
190
 
All Briefs–
%Responsive 
Citation Similarity 
0.69 <10e-4 
Incremental 
Responsiveness 
All Briefs–
%Responded 
Citation Similarity 
0.40 0.0287 
Categorical 
Responsiveness 
Elaboration 0.69 0.0002 
Incremental 
Responsiveness 
Elaboration 0.67 <10e-4 
All Briefs–
%Responsive 
All Briefs/Opinion 
Textual Similarity 
0.47 0.0091 
 
Several conclusions follow from these numbers. Beginning with the 
positive, the results suggest the validity of our citation analysis as a 
measure of responsiveness. The strongest correlation in the table is 
between the percentage of authorities cited in an opinion that were also 
cited in a brief (All Briefs–%Responsive) and our Incremental 
Responsiveness (IR) assessment. That same measure of authorities is 
also correlated, though not quite as strongly, with our Categorical 
Responsiveness measure. IR is also correlated with the percentage of 
authorities cited in any brief that are also cited in the opinion (All 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Categorical Responsiveness was also correlated in a significant way with Citation 
Analysis–%Responsive (Appellant + Reply) (0.3774/0.0398), and Citation Analysis–
%Responsive (Appellee) (0.4273/0.0185). 
 190. Incremental Responsiveness was also correlated in a significant way with Citation 
Similarity–%Responsive (Appellant + Reply) (0.4159/0.0223), and Citation Similarity–
%Responsive (Appellee) (0.5153/0.0036). 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/2
2012] TRIANGULATING JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS 1237 
 
Briefs–%Responded). Although, as we discuss below, the absolute 
percentages involved in these measures seem strikingly low, the 
analysis confirms our intuition that a more responsive analysis will tend 
to involve greater reference to the authorities cited by the parties. In 
short, the results support the conclusion that citation analysis is a valid 
measure of judicial responsiveness.  
While the results show that our measure of textual similarity has 
promise, they also suggest that further refinement is in order. Two 
textual analysis scores—for the similarities between appellee briefs and 
the opinions, and for the similarity among the appellant-side and 
appellee-side briefs—were correlated with our IR measure. Both results 
comport with our intuitions: the former because one would anticipate 
similarities between briefs and a responsive opinion, and the latter 
because a dispute in which the parties‘ arguments are more tightly 
bound to one another seems more likely to be one in which a court will 
address their arguments in a responsive manner. Perhaps the most 
promising result in this regard is the final one displayed in Table 9, 
which is the correlation between All Briefs–%Responsive and All 
Briefs/Opinion–Textual Similarity. What this suggests is that there is 
greater textual similarity among the briefs and opinions in cases in 
which the parties and court base their analyses on the same authority. 
Beyond that, however, none of the document similarity scores produced 
a significant correlation with either of our manually generated measures 
of responsiveness. 
These are, of course, complex relationships, and our data suggest 
certain concerns of which to be mindful as we develop this line of 
research. For example, the extent to which a court can be responsive in 
a way that will register as such using these measures will sometimes 
turn on whether the parties have a common conception of their dispute. 
If the parties disagree about the nature of the issues in a case, a court 
could easily issue an opinion that, while responsive, would score low on 
both of our measures. For example, if one party offers an argument that 
the court accepts, and that, when resolved, renders the remainder of the 
issues before the court moot, then the opinion will likely fail to register 
as responsive under either of our automated methodologies even though 
the court may have resolved the case in an entirely appropriate way. In 
similar fashion, the strong correlation between our coding for 
elaboration and both of our manually coded responsiveness measures 
might give us pause. Although our measurement of elaboration was 
intended to capture more than mere length of opinion, the correlation 
suggested the need to ensure that our measures were not testing largely 
for length. We found no significant correlation between length of 
opinion (measured with stop words excluded) and either IR or All 
Briefs–%Responsive. This is consistent with the possibility that our 
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measures of elaboration and responsiveness were ultimately assessing 
different aspects of the same underlying phenomena. There was, 
however, a significant correlation between opinion length and our 
textual analysis document similarity scores for all briefs compared to 
the opinions.
191
  
b.  Suggestions from the Results of Our Sample 
Although they are not the focus of our study, the results of our 
automated coding as applied to our sample of cases are intriguing in 
their own right and suggest topics for future investigation. Considering 
first the textual similarity scores, the range of scores (presented in Table 
6) strikes us as quite large. With a large enough set of cases, it might be 
possible to uncover relationships between, for example, the outcomes in 
cases and their responsiveness to appellants or appellees. (We found no 
significant correlation between results and any of our measures of 
responsiveness within our thirty cases.) Courts and judges could also be 
compared in terms of the extent to which their opinions are similar to 
the briefs. Further refinements could account for variances based on 
subject matter or litigant characteristics. The development of 
appropriate baselines—beginning with average similarity scores for a 
large set of unrelated document pairs—would enable normative 
judgments about performance. 
Another potentially noteworthy finding concerns the difference in 
scores between principal and reply briefs, with the latter scoring 
substantially lower regardless of the form of the briefs analyzed. This is 
true even when we consider only the subset of cases involving reply 
briefs. In those cases, the average textual similarity score for the 
comparison between reply briefs and opinions is 60.9, while it is 68.2 
and 71.4 for appellant and appellee briefs, respectively. It is difficult to 
know what to make of this, particularly given the correlation between 
document length and similarity scores, but the results suggest that 
further inquiry might reveal interesting information concerning the 
nature and utility of reply briefs. 
The results of our citation analysis are interesting because they show 
that, within this sample of cases, the First Circuit did not typically 
restrict itself to the universe of authorities cited by the parties, and 
indeed, failed to refer to the bulk of the authorities mentioned in the 
briefs. On average, only 35% of the authorities cited in the court‘s 
opinions were among those cited by the parties, and the court cited just 
over 16% of the authorities referenced in the briefs. These numbers 
undoubtedly understate responsiveness to some degree because our 
methodology does not give greater weight to authorities to which the 
                                                                                                                     
 191. More specifically, the correlation coefficient is 0.39, with a p-value of 0.03. 
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parties make multiple references. Even so, it is striking how little 
overlap there is between the parties‘ citations and the court‘s.192 This 
suggests that judges have, and exercise, a considerable amount of 
discretion in choosing which precedent to follow; this is, at the very 
least, consistent with attitudinal descriptions of judicial behavior.
193
 
Here, too, the measure offers an intriguing avenue for exploring the 
relative performance of courts and judges, not only broken down in 
terms of the factors we identify above, but also to account for the nature 
of the authorities to which references were made. 
IV.  NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUSION 
Efforts at using computational techniques to analyze judicial 
opinions and other legal documents remain in their early stages, and 
past efforts have yielded mixed results.
194
 Even so, automated content 
analysis will undoubtedly play a greater role in legal scholarship in 
coming decades. The combination of greater availability of information 
in electronic formats coupled with increased sophistication of 
computational techniques should enable increasingly varied and 
sophisticated investigations. Our aim in this Article has been simply to 
establish the value of the methodology, and to demonstrate that resort to 
basic methods of automated content analysis can provide useful 
information about the relationship among the briefs and opinions in a 
case. We conclude by outlining potential refinements to our 
methodology, as well as potential avenues for the use of automated 
content analysis more generally. 
With respect to our study, while our measures show promise, they 
also suggest the possibility of superior computational approaches to 
quantifying responsiveness. One foreseeably productive approach is to 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Indeed, the First Circuit in our sample cited an even lower portion of the cases 
referenced in the briefs than prior research comparing briefs and opinions in the U.S. Supreme 
Court found. See William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A 
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267, 294 (2002) (finding that ―[s]lightly more than 25% of 
Supreme Court decisions cited in the briefs also appeared in the opinions‖ and ―[a]pproximately 
25% of the Court‘s case citations did not appear in any of the briefs‖). 
 193. See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of 
their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 527–28; Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1277 (2008) (noting ―the 
value of examining the briefs of the parties as a cue for evaluating the Court‘s citation 
practices‖). As Justice Cardozo noted over ninety years ago, ―in a system so highly developed as 
our own, precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from which 
the labor of the judge begins.‖ BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
19–20 (1921). 
 194. See Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions, supra note 7, at 1121 (finding 
that computational techniques somewhat correlates with authorship); Evans et al., supra note 7, 
at 1036 (finding that computational techniques ―hold[] great promise‖ for future research). 
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develop scores that are a function of both citations and text. Since text 
and citations are disjoint sources of evidence, and as both measures 
correlate positively with our manually annotated responsiveness scores, 
it is probable that appropriately combined scores would correlate more 
strongly with our manual annotations than do scores based on a single 
type of evidence. The key, of course, is to intelligently combine text and 
citation evidence. Supervised learning methods, such as multiple 
regression and support vector machines, are designed to learn functions 
such as this. These approaches induce a mathematical function mapping 
inputs (text and citation attributes) to outputs (responsiveness) from a 
training set of input/output pairs. An advantage of the learning approach 
is that since the mapping function is learned automatically, more (and 
more complex) attributes can be readily incorporated with little 
overhead. If, for example, we wished to distinguish among different 
types of cited authorities (state law, United States Code, previous case, 
etc.), we could create attributes for each citation type, and use 
supervised algorithms to learn how to synthesize a case‘s attribute 
values into responsiveness scores. Other attributes that can be 
considered under the supervised methodology include term-specific 
weights, for example, to identify specific words indicative of 
responsiveness, and term patterns within the context of sentences, 
paragraphs, sections, and other higher-level document elements. 
More broadly, we believe that automated content analysis holds out 
the promise of expanding the scope of topics for research. The ability to 
compare large numbers of briefs and opinions can facilitate the 
exploration of not only the behavior of different actors in the 
system
195—various types of courts and judges and litigants—but also, 
as the capacity for digitizing archival material improves, changes in 
those actors‘ behavior over time.  
                                                                                                                     
195. Michael Evans and his co-authors outline the following possibilities: 
If the textual inputs and outputs [of the various actors in the legal system] 
can be reliably and meaningfully quantified, then a variety of innovative 
research questions can be addressed. What explains the ideological positions of 
the briefs submitted by litigants to a case? Are they influenced by positions 
taken by today‘s median justice in his or her opinion in a previous case? How 
do litigants‘ positions compare to the positions taken by amicus curiae? Do 
different types of interest groups submit more or less ideologically extreme 
amicus curiae briefs? How do repeat players‘ positions vary over time? Under 
what conditions (e.g., case salience, coalition size, type of opinion, 
position/clarity of relevant precedent) do justices articulate extreme or 
moderate positions? Do lower court opinions exhibit ideological shifts in 
response to change in Supreme Court policy? Can litigant success be explained 
by the positions taken in their briefs? 
Evans et al., supra note 7, at 1020–21. 
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These efforts promise to lead us to a greatly enhanced understanding 
of the workings of the judiciary and the legal system more generally. A 
related hope underlying much of this work is that a relatively well-
developed understanding might support efforts at prediction. That is, we 
might expect that textual analysis—perhaps supplemented by 
information external to the text, such as judicial ideology or the identity 
of counsel—will develop to the point where we have such a refined 
ability to account for the factors presented by a new case that we can 
predict to a great degree of accuracy how it will be resolved. Recent 
efforts at prediction have attained a relatively high degree of predictive 
accuracy within limited domains,
196
 but much work remains.
197
 
Part of that work—and it is work that might ameliorate somewhat 
the perceived gap between what legal academics do and what might 
benefit legal practitioners—can be done through automated content 
analysis. It will remain, at least until computers are able to ―read‖ and 
comprehend text, an imperfect mode of inquiry, another tool in the 
scholar‘s toolbox, rather than a replacement for what has come before 
it.
198
 We believe that inquiries of the sort we engage in above will, 
particularly when expanded to take into account the full spectrum of 
                                                                                                                     
 196. For example, Professor Kevin Ashley and his colleague Stefanie Brüninghaus 
compared several computerized prediction methods applied to the same set of 184 trade secret 
misappropriation cases drawn from both federal and state courts over a several-decade period. 
Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Brüninghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction, 46 
JURIMETRICS 309, 333, 337 (2006). Their models ranged from 57.6% to 91.8% accurate in their 
predictions. Id. at 338. The Supreme Court Forecasting Project, using a model based on six 
observable case characteristics, managed to predict the outcome of cases in the Supreme Court‘s 
2002 term at a 75% rate of accuracy, as contrasted with a 59.1% rate for a panel of experts. See 
Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1151–52, 
1154 & n.19 (2004). 
 197. Ashley and Brüninghaus conclude that ―problems of representing textual cases for 
purposes of prediction are still major hurdles, and most prediction approaches have not been 
able to explain predictions in terms of legal reasons that are meaningful to legal practitioners.‖ 
Ashley & Brüninghaus, supra note 196, at 310. As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed out, 
in the context of relating the views of Karl Llewellyn, this may be because many of those 
reasons are not of the sort that are, in a formal sense, legally meaningful: 
Llewellyn did not deny that there were regularities in law. Nor did he deny that 
those regularities might facilitate the process of predicting future legal 
outcomes. He did, however, deny that those regularities were regularly 
captured by the generalizations typically referred to as ―legal doctrine,‖ and 
thus claimed that legal doctrine did not reflect empirical regularities, and that 
legal regularities were reflected by categorizations that did not resemble 
traditional legal doctrine. 
Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 782 (1998).  
 198. See generally Richard Esenberg, A Modest Proposal for Human Limitations on 
Cyberdiscovery, 64 FLA. L. REV. 965 (2012).  
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information available in a case, enable considerably more informed 
assessments of whether judicial opinions tell an accurate story about the 
cases they resolve. Although some portions of the process will remain 
shielded from view, the result will be a considerably broader and more 
nuanced picture of how the judiciary works. 
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